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HISTORY "LITE" IN MODERN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Martin S. Flaherty*
Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be
appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.
The Federalist No. 6
INTRODUCTION

Americans love to invoke history, but not necessarily to learn it. Typical, perhaps transcendental, in this regard was Ronald Reagan, who glo-

ried in blithely rendered historical misstatements.2 What applies to
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. B.A. 1981, Princeton University;
M.A 1982, M. Phil. 1987, Yale University; J.D. 1988, Columbia Law School.

Earlier versions of this article were presented to the Fordham Faculty Works-inProgress Colloquium and the New York University Legal History Colloquium. I would like
to thank Bruce Ackerman, Richard Bernstein, Jon Butler, Chris Eisgruber, Jill Fisch, James
Fleming, Robert Kaczorowski, James Kainen, Larry Kramer, William La Piana, Frank
Michelman, Edmund S. Morgan, William Nelson, Liam O'Melinn, Russell Pearce, John
Phillip Reid, Dan Richman, William Michael Treanor, Mark Tushnet, and Lloyd Weinreb
for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. My thanks as well to Richard Epstein and
Cass Sunstein for useful and constructive exchanges as they prepared their published
responses. Finally, I would like to record my debt to Zain E. Hussain and Hwan-Hui Helen
Lee for invaluable research assistance.

1. The Federalist No. 6, at 57 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. President Reagan, for example, once spoke of how the desegregation of America's
military came about "'in World War II ... largely under the leadership of generals like
MacArthur and Eisenhower'." James D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting
Performance in the White House 495 (3d ed. 1985). Recounting one memorable scene,
the President stated:

When the Japanese dropped the bomb on Pearl Harbor there was a Negro sailor
whose total duties involved kitchen-type duties .... He cradled a machine gun in
his arms, which is not an easy thing to do, and stood at the end of a pier blazing
away at Japanese airplanes that were coming down and strafing him and that
[segregation] was all changed.

Id. When an observant reporter pointed out that Truman had ordered the prohibition of
the practice of segregation at least three years after the war had culminated, the President
wistfully responded, "I remember the scene .... It was very powerful." Id.
This phenomenon is hardly confined either to President Reagan or to those who
supported him. As one historian notes, "[W]e have had a series of prominent public

figures, from Harry S Truman to Ronald Reagan, who have misread, distorted, or
trivialized the national past for self-serving purposes or for the vindication of misguided
policies, foreign and domestic." Michael Kammen, Selvages and Biases: The Fabric of
History in American Culture 19 (1987); see also Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: The
Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (1973).
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American history likewise applies to the history of the American Constitu-

tion. In his landmark work about the Constitution in American culture,

A Machine That Would Go of Itself, historian Michael Kammen persuasively
argues that though "America is always talking about its Constitution,"3 its
"fulsome rhetoric of reverence [has been] more than offset by the reality

of ignorance."4
For better and for worse, a similar theme of allure and apathy char-

acterizes the work of constitutional "professionals." Lawyers, judges,
and-the ultimate concern of this Article-legal academics regularly
turn to history when talking about the Constitution, and not merely as a
rhetorical trope.5 This point obtains most strongly for originalists, for

whom the use of history is dispositive in settling constitutional questions.6
Yet some affinity for history, while not necessarily universal, cuts across

various axes. It is apparent in works both recent7 and classic.8 It issues

3. Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of Itself: The Constitution In

American Culture 3, 217-314 (1986).
4. Id. at 3. Kammen's study concentrates on the perceptions of "ordinary" Americans,

whom he identifies as "nonprofessionals" who do not practice law or teach constitutional
law. Id. at xi. Kammen's work does not make a sharp distinction between ignorance of the

Constitution and ignorance of constitutional history, but instead views these two subjects as
intertwined. See id. passim.

5. With regard to the bar, some of the more recent and lengthy-and more
rigorous-historical treatments include the following: Brief of 250 American Historians as

Amici Curiae in Support of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Planned

Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902);
Brief Amicus Curiae of Eric Foner, John H. Franklin, Louis R. Harlan, Stanley N. Katz,
Leon F. Litwack, C. Vann Woodward, and Mary Frances Berry, Patterson v. McClean Credit

Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107).
With regard to the bench, some more recent and lengthy-and self-evidently
problematic-historical treatments include the following: New York v. United States, 112

S. Ct. 2408, 2417-23 (1992) (O'Connor, J.); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668-70
(Souter, J., concurring) (1992); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-75 (1991)
(Scalia, J.); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456-60 (1991) (O'Connor, J.); Dennis v.
Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 452-58 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478

U.S. 186, 192-95 (1986) (White, J.); id. at 196-97 (Burger, CJ., concurring). For a
cautionary antidote, see New York v. United States at 2444 n.3 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).

6. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law
143-60 (1990).

7. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-government in American
Constitutional Theory (1993).

8. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics (1962).
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not only from the Right9 but also from the Left.'0 It is even evident
among theorists whose work is often seen as antithetical to originalism."I
Despite this propensity, or maybe because of it, constitutional discourse is replete with historical assertions that are at best deeply problematic and at worst, howlers. Robert Bork's The Tempting of America is filled
with authoritative historical conclusions yet cites scarcely any primary or,

for that matter, secondary sources.'2 Paul Kahn, in a study entitled
Legitimacy and History, boldly divides American constitutional thought
into six successive "models of construction," but does so on the basis of
few primary works for any given period and with scant reference to secon-

dary literature.13 Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, relying on
early state separation of powers clauses, confidently state that "a separate
category of administrative power to be apportioned by the legislature did
not exist in the Framers' world," without pausing to consider how the very
constitutions they single out dramatically undercut their claim.14 The il9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (1985).

10. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process

(1980); David AJ. Richards, Foundations of American Constitutionalism (1989); David A
Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (1986).

11. Even Ronald Dworkin, as steadfast a foe of originalism as exists, will occasionally
make an historical assertion. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 360 (1986) ("In
fact the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by lawmakers who thought they were not
outlawing racially segregated education.").

12. See Bork, supra note 6. For a short and devastating critique on this score, see
Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 Yale LJ. 1419, 1422-25 (1990)
(reviewing Bork, supra note 6, arguing that Bork has "cast off the constraints of the judge
without accepting the disciplines of the scholar").
13. Kahn, supra note 7, passim. Gordon S. Wood provides a telling methodological
contrast in The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1992) [hereinafter Wood,
Radicalism]. There, he divides American political culture between 1750 and 1850 into
three general periods, but relies on hundreds of primary sources and dozens of secondary
works to make the point. This is not to say that a theorist like Kahn must engage in the
same rigorous research undertaken by a leading historian. Kahn's avowed project,
however, is to derive a morphology of constitutional discourse over time based on a
descriptive account of the development of American constitutional discourse. To the

extent that his argument rests on history (or historiography), it would be more convincing
if his methodology relied more heavily on intellectual history monographs at least.
For a discussion of basic methodological standards for making convincing historical
assertions, see infra text accompanying notes 122-143.
14. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Law, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 607 (1994). More specifically, Calabresi and Prakash quote the
separation of powers clauses of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 and the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 to conclude that, for the Framers, "[t]he Executive alone was
empowered to execute all laws." Id.
With regard to Virginia, Calabresi and Prakash ignore a wealth of historical

scholarship demonstrating that most of the state constitutions framed in 1776 and 1777
gave rhetorical support to the formalistic conception of separation of powers that the
authors assert but in fact established governments that approached legislative supremacy

largely at the expense of executive authority. As Gordon Wood notes, "[w]hat more than
anything else makes the use of Montesquieu's maxim [that the legislative, executive, and
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lustrations could go on.15 The point of most (though not all) of them is
not that the particular assertion may or may not be tenable. Rather, it is

that habits of poorly supported generalization-which at times fall below

even the standards of undergraduate history writing-pervade the work
of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to talk
about the Constitution.16

judicial departments ought to be separate and distinct] in 1776 perplexing is the great
discrepancy between the affirmations of the need to separate the several governmental
departments and the actual political practice the state governments followed. It seems, as

historians have noted, that Americans in 1776 gave only a verbal recognition to the
concept of separation of powers in their Revolutionary constitutions, since they were
apparently not concerned with a real division of departmental functions." Gordon S.

Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 153-54 (1969) [hereinafter Wood,
Creation]; see id. at 127-61; see also Willi P. Adams, The First American Constitutions:
Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era

275 (1980) (arguing thatJames Madison could easily refute as irrelevant the charge that
the Constitution failed to keep the three governmental powers separate and distinct).
The reliance of Calabresi and Prakash on the Massachusetts Constitution is similarly
problematic. In fact, Massachusetts's political practice fell short of its near absolute

separation of powers clause in much the same way that Virginia fell short of its earlier,
more cryptic version. The document, for example, provided for a "council, for advising
the governor in the executive part of the government," which would further assume the

governor's authority, and was chosen by the assembly. Mass. Const. of 1780, ch. II, sec. 3,
arts. I-VII. More striking, the assembly also appointed what in a modern formalist

conception would be a fair portion of the executive branch, including: "the secretary,
treasurer, receiver-general, commissary-general, notaries public and naval officers." Id.

sec. 4, art. I. That said, the Massachusetts Constitution did reflect an enhancement of

executive authority, in part as a reaction to the legislative excesses of constitutions like

Virginia's, though Calabresi and Prakash do not note this point. See Wood, Creation,
supra, at 446-53. For a treatment that comes far closer to capturing the complexity and

nature of Founding commitments in this area, see Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances
in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 138-53 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 360 (arguing, on the basis of a single

statement from the floor manager of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the fact that the same

Congress continued to segregate District of Columbia schools, that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended abolition of segregated schools);
Choper, supra note 10, at 244 (arguing, without relying on primary sources other than The

Federalist, that "the assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact protect,
individual constitutional freedoms . . . has no solid historical or logical basis").
16. One reason for the lack of standards among many constitutional theorists is the

difficulty of interdisciplinary exchange. As William E. Nelson has observed, lawyers and
historians do not share a professional ethos. Lawyers, including legal academics, place a
premium on making arguments. By contrast, historians emphasize explanation, context,

and secondary works, as well as primary sources. See William E. Nelson, History and
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1237 (1986).
From this divergence several practical differences flow. Where historians must sift

through primary sources, lawyers need concern themselves with only minimal research,
and then mostly in prepackaged reporters or databases. The classic article on how

differently lawyers and historians approach the past is Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court,
1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 119, 155-58; cf. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions
of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349 (1989); Robert W.
Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L. J. 1017 (1981); Charles Miller, The
Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969). Conversely, where the historical
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While historical scholarship itself for a long time exacerbated these
ahistorical habits, it now provides unprecedented opportunities for informing our constitutional present with our constitutional past. Such, at
any rate, is the case with the Foundingl7 and, no less important, the developments that led to it.18 Earlier historians too readily looked abroad
to England and the Continent to make sense of early American experience and in the process ignored or denigrated the distinctive constitutional achievements that this experience produced. Many theorists followed and still follow suit.19 In the past two generations, however,
profession generally allows far more time for pursuing a project, its legal counterpart
places a premium on speed and productivity. See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok:
Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1990).
Legal academics, in short, generally lack the perspective, time, or knowledge of
sources to pursue historical study well. As John Hart Ely wryly notes, "Now I know lawyers
are a cocky lot: the fact that our profession brings us into contact with many disciplines
often generates the delusion that we have mastered them all." John Hart Ely, Democracy
and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 56 (1980). If the foregoing sampler is any
indication, Ely's observation applies with special force to the use of history in constitutional
discourse.

17. I employ the conventional labels when referring to periods and events relevant to
early American constitutional history. Thus, the "Revolution" refers to the late eighteenthcentury American struggle, both rhetorical and armed, against British claims of authority
over the colonies; "Independence" refers to the successful American assertion of autonomy
from Great Britain; "Critical Period," refers to the era between Independence and the

framing of the Constitution; "Founding" refers to the efforts that culminated in the
drafting and ratification of the Federal Constitution.
By contrast, I do not follow the usual practice in using "Founders" rather than
"Framers." Strictly speaking, "Framers" applies only to the fifty-five men who participated
in the Philadelphia Convention, which drafted the document. In historical terms,

speaking of the "Framers" leaves out numerous individuals-John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson to name two-who were critical to early American constitutional thinking. Cf. 1
The Founders' Constitution at xiii (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
According to most theoretical accounts, moreover, the views that merit greater weight are
not those of the Framers, who merely proposed a plan of government, but those who
ratified that plan in state conventions. See, e.g., Charles Lofgren, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Commentary 77, 79-85 (1988) (arguing that
the relevant intent for original intent analysis is ratifier intent). Finally, for the purposes of
this Article, "early American" refers to the period starting with American resistance to
British Parliamentary rule and concluding with the ratification of the Federal Constitution.
18. Where the history of the Founding itself "has not flourished in the last half

century," the Revolution has long been the brooding omnipresence over much early
American scholarship. Just as the Revolution has overshadowed the Founding, it has
dominated study of the colonial period. As Joyce Appleby notes, "The generations of
colonial life merged into a preparatory stage for the sequence of national events that
began with the Revolution. And since the Revolution itself was treated as a precedentshattering moment in world history, interest was always skewed toward the exceptional."
Joyce Appleby, A Different Kind of Independence: The Postwar Restructuring of the
Historical Study of Early America, 50 Wm. & Mary Q. 245, 246 (3rd ser. 1993).

19. Set forth most recently in his ongoing We the People project, Ackerman declares
that "[w]hile our civic practice remains rooted in the distinctive patterns of the American
past, sophisticated constitutional thought has increasingly elaborated the genius of
American institutions with theories fabricated elsewhere-to the point where these rivals
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numerous scholars have instead taken seriously the ideas that early American political thinkers espoused. A few of these have even attempted to

do justice to the legal and constitutional facets of those ideas. Together,
their work goes a long way toward the rediscovery of American constitutionalism as it existed before Independence, which in turn illuminates

the "Critical Period" under the Articles of Confederation, which further
elucidates the Founding itself.
The rediscovery of America's formative constitutional traditions
promises a wealth of historical insights closer to home for any theorist

inclined to look at the past. So far, that wealth has been only partially
tapped. Theorists such as Richard Epstein, committed to at least one version of foundational rights, claim to look at the American past but see
little more than John Locke. Other thinkers, including Cass Sunstein,

Susanna Sherry, and other "neo-," "modern," or "civic" republicans,
themselves committed to democratic discourse, actually acknowledge the

historical complexity that current scholarship recounts.20 Too many,
however, effectively disregard those elements of early constitutional
thought that fail to echo the polis of Athens or the republics of the

are more familiar than [America's own distinctive] framework." 1 Bruce Ackerman, We
the People: Foundations 5-6 (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman, We the People].
These "theories fabricated elsewhere" broadly fall into two camps: one Anglophilic;

the other, Anglo-German. One, which Ackerman calls "monist democracy," presumes that

"[d]emocracy requires the grant of plenary lawmaking authority to the winners of the last
general election," and features thinkers such as Woodrow Wilson, James Bradley Thayer,

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and John Hart Ely. Id. at 7. In overt and subtle ways, these
and other monist democrats turn for inspiration to "the brooding omnipresence [of] an
idealized version of British parliamentary practice." Id. The other school, which
Ackerman terms "rights foundationalism," posits that the American Constitution is "first

and foremost" about the protection of fundamental rights. This school is represented by
such diverse theorists as Ronald Dworkin, Richard Epstein, and Owen Fiss. On

Ackerman's view, foundationalist thinkers draw on philosophers such as "Kant (via Rawls)
and Locke (via Nozick)." Id. at 11.
What follows from this deep engagement with political thought developed in other
nations, Ackerman argues, has been a cursory, almost embarrassed encounter with the
constitutional past that emerged in the United States. Or, as Ackerman puts it, the
problem is not

that modernist commentators disdain the use of selective quotations from the
Federalist and other canonical sources. They simply do not use these sources to
elaborate the distinctive political ideal that they contain. Instead, they cast the
Founders as derivative social engineers, the makers of a better mousetrap from

plans prepared elsewhere.
Id. at 36.

20. Some of the most prominent works of the "civic republican" school include:
Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986);
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
Va. L. Rev. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan.
L. Rev. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; see generally, Kathryn Abrams,
Law's Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1591 (1988); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The

Career of a Concept, 79J. Am. Hist. 11, 33-34 (1992).
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Renaissance.2' Somewhere in between, Bruce Ackerman offers an interpretive theory of the Founding that is hardly less intricate or provocative.
This Article explores the historiography of early American constitutionalism to suggest the insights that have yet to emerge fully from a serious engagement with America's own formative constitutional experience.
Part II looks to earlier historical work to show that this current rediscovery was long in coming because historians themselves had been dominated by English models on the one hand, and by Continental models on
the other. Part III explores the recent rediscovery of early American constitutionalism and the rich possibilities it presents for historically-minded
theorists. It first recounts how this rediscovery proceeded, with special
emphasis on material as yet ignored by modern constitutional thinkers,
and then examines the main themes advanced by the resulting historical
scholarship. Part IV begins with a discussion of the basic standards that
should be used to measure the historical assertions made by constitutional theorists, and then applies these standards to a sampling of the
efforts by several of the leading theorists working today. It continues by

suggesting that modern constitutional theory itself has yet to make full
use of the opportunity that recent historical scholarship presents because
it retains the earlier historians' habit of looking elsewhere. Specifically,
"neo-liberals" such as Richard Epstein overplay the early American commitment to rights, and "neo-republicans" such as Sunstein overemphasize
the Founding commitment to civic virtue and political participation.
Only Ackerman, the Part contends, attempts to reconstruct how the
Founding generation reconciled various strands of constitutional thought
in a historically credible fashion, though even his work falls short in certain respects. The Article concludes that any theory opting for reductive
simplicity, especially for the sake of either democratic process or individual liberty, is likely to forfeit its claim to historical credibility, at least to
the extent it purports to rest on the nation's nascent constitutional experience. If early American constitutional development reveals anything, it
reveals that neither those who would base their theories preeminently on
rights and autonomy, nor those who would ground their paradigms exclusively on self-government and democracy, can lay easy claim to the traditions that the Constitution itself embodies-try though they might.
II. HISTORIES FABRICATED ELSEWHERE

For much of this century (and the last), few historians took early
American constitutional thought seriously. In part for this reason, theorists like Edward Corwin often had to invent the historical wheel themselves.22 This historiographical blind spot, in turn, stemmed in no small
21. See Rodgers, supra note 20.

22. A notable example in this respect is Corwin's rigorous historical critique-much
of which is based on his own research-of ChiefJustice Taft's assertions in Myers v. United

States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See Edward S. Corwin, The President's Removal Power Under

the Constitution (1927).
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degree from the tendency of earlier historians to look outside the United
States-in particular, either to England or the Continent-for models to
explain how the nation became independent and established a successful
central government. Understanding this tendency helps to explain why
theorists had relatively little historical material to consult for so long.
More importantly, such an understanding helps account for the parallel

habit of constitutional theorists of looking abroad for their own modelsa habit that is only now breaking down as it did for historians forty years
ago.

A. Rule (Onward) Britannia
Colonial Whigs undertook the resistance that would lead to revolution. But it was a later set of Whigs, indebted to their scholarly counterparts in England, that would first record that process exhaustively. Nowhere did the views of this "Whig School" find more authoritative or
eloquent expression than in the works of George Bancroft. With a doggedness that is the envy of any successor, Bancroft combined an encyclopedic command of available sources with a muscular narrative style to
produce his epic ten-volume History of the United States, originally appearing between 1834 and 1874.23 Although this work may have set new standards of rigor, its conclusions have not endured.
Yet one stance taken by the Whig historians persists, and that is

Bancroft's practice of overlooking the constitutional arguments made in
the years surrounding the Revolution itself. This habit followed because
the Whig conception of the struggle, unlike that of the original Whigs
who participated in it, had little place for constitutional explanations.

For Bancroft, a Yankee nationalist, Jacksonian Democrat, Navy Secretary
under Polk, and minister to Britain and Prussia, the Revolution was a
chapter in a much larger, all but predestined story. In that story, English
settlers in the New World found themselves blessed to inhabit a land with
enough empty space and with sufficient distance from Old World decadence to give full vent to the natural human yearning for liberty. On this
account, revolutionary resistance took shape as a conflict between an
American population dedicated to freedom on one side, and, on the
other, a rigid monarch and venal Parliament bent on controlling the colonies, even at the price of imposing tyranny. In the Whig rendition,
therefore, American complaints were not seen as specific constitutional
grievances so much as a general outcry against a "war on human
freedom. "24
Far from rehabilitating constitutional thought, the initial challenge
to the Whigs only made matters worse. By the turn of the twentieth cen-

23. Bancroft condensed the work into six volumes in his final revisions. See George
Bancroft, History of the United States of America, From the Discovery of the Continent
(New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1886).
24. 3 id. at 482.
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tury, Bancroft's romantic patriotism had produced scholarly reactions
which, along with attendant claims of dispassionate, professional, and
"scientific" methods of historical craft, set in motion the yin and yang of
revisionism and counterrevisionism that have been the hallmark of the
field ever since. Itself influenced by a Wilsonian-style Anglophilia prominent in American universities and in U.S. foreign policy prior to the First
World War, the foremost response to the Whig view not surprisingly
adopted an English perspective. Out of the ranks of this Imperial School
came some of the foremost colonialists from the first half of this century,
including Herbert Levi Osgood, George Louis Beer, Charles McLean
Andrews, Leonard Larabee, and finally, Lawrence Henry Gipson.

Despite important differences, common themes pervaded the works
of these men. Each rejected the simple tale of British tyranny oppressing
America, instead emphasizing that imperial policies that led to the conflict were a reasonable response to the colonies' refusal to contribute an

adequate share to the upkeep of the Empire. From this viewpoint, independence arose not because the British government was bent on imposing tyrannical control, but because geography inevitably led Americans to
have different interests than their English counterparts an ocean away.
Once France and Spain had been removed from North America as

threats in 1763, little remained to prevent the colonists from going the
own way. For each side, the point was not constitutional principle, but
pragmatic self-interest.25

Ironically, Imperial historians could dismiss the importance of American constitutional arguments, not because they ignored them, but precisely because others in their ranks considered those arguments and mistakenly found them to be wanting. Matters seemed to begin promisingly
enough with the pioneering efforts of Charles McIlwain. In his 1923 volume, The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation, McIlwain argued that Parliament had not legislated outside the realm of England
until well after the colonies had been settled, that subsequent imperial
legislation constituted an innovation without required colonial consent,
and that therefore the colonists had legitimate constitutional complaints

about Parliamentary interference.26 Shortly after McIlwain's thesis appeared, however, Robert Livingston Schuyler attempted not only to refute, but to demolish it. Citing one act of Parliament after another,
25. See Herbert L. Osgood, The American Revolution, 13 Pol. Sci. Q. 41 (1898);
George L. Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (1922); Charles M. Andrews, The
Colonial Background of the American Revolution: Four Essays in American Colonial
History 62-66 (1964); Leonard W. Larabee, Royal Government in America (1930);
Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution (15 vols.
1958-70). Gipson, whose multi-volume opus is the most comprehensive of all the works
cited, distilled the basic argument of the Imperial School. See Lawrence H. Gipson, The

American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, 1754-1763, 65 Pol.
Sci. Q. 86 (1950).

26. See Charles H. McIlwain, The American Revolution: A Constitutional

Interpretation 186-98, passim (1966).
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Schuyler's Parliament and the British Empire established that Parliament in
fact had legislated for the dominions outside England since at least the

fourteenth century.27 In short order, the same scholarly community that
had cheered McIlwain's Pulitzer Prize winning conclusions turned away

from his thesis in embarrassment.28 That said, not all historians felt compelled to take sides. Andrew C. McLaughlin, for one, sagely implied that

the very disagreement between "[s]cholars of unquestioned skill and
learning" over rival American and British claims indicated that neither

side could claim "indubitable legal correctness. "29 In the main, however,
the Imperial School had apparently confirmed that whether sincere or

disingenuous, colonial arguments that the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, or
the Townshend duties amounted to constitutional violations were simply
wrong, and that the causes for the Revolution lay outside the arena of
legitimate constitutional quarrel.
B. The Continental Divide

With the Progressives, the fate of constitutional scholarship hit bottom. It also became the victim of approaches derived not from English

Whigs, but from German Marxists and "scientific" historians.30 For the
Progressives, American constitutional claims were more than erroneous
or even irrelevant. They were deceitful. This conclusion logically followed from Progressive premises. Whereas the Imperial historians re-

jected the Whig view by looking outward and emphasizing policy and administration, the Progressives responded by looking inward with a view
towards economics and social division. In this emphasis, Progressive historians reflected their contemporary political namesakes.31
Following up pioneering studies by Charles Kendall Adams, Charles

H. Lincoln, Carl Becker, and not least himself,32 Arthur M. Schlesinger,
27. See Robert L. Schuyler, Parliament and the British Empire: Some Constitutional
Controversies Concerning Imperial Legislative Jurisdiction 1-39 (1963).

28. For an initially favorable response to Mc~lwain, see G.B. Adams, Book Review, 33
Yale L.J. 567, 568 (1924). For a representative assessment of McIlwain in light of Schuyler's
work, see Julius Goebel, Jr., Book Review, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 273, 273 (1930). For an
overall account of the "Schuyler/McIlwain" debate, see Barbara A. Black, The Constitution

of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1157, 1158-62 (1976); Martin S.

Flaherty, Note, The Empire Strikes Back: Annesley v. Sherlock and the Triumph of Imperial
Parliamentary Supremacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev., 593, 594-96 (1987); Liam S. O'Melinn,
Note, The American Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Seventeenth-Century West
Indies, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 104, 105-14 (1995).

29. Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 82 (1935).
30. See Kammen, supra note 3, at 114-15.
31. For a general account, see Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians:
Turner, Beard, Parrington (1968).

32. See Carl L. Becker, The History of the Political Parties in the Province of New
York, 1760-1776 (1909); Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in
Pennsylvania, 1760-1776 (1968); Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the

American Revolution, 1763-1776 (1957); Charles K Adams, Some Neglected Aspects of
the Revolutionary War, 82 The Atlantic Monthly, 174-89 (1898).
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Sr. rendered the blueprint on which the Progressives would build in an
article entitled "The American Revolution Reconsidered."33 Schlesinger
contended that the colonies themselves were divided into commercial
and slaveowning aristocracies along the seaboard, and democratic elements in the cities and the interior; the aristocratic classes, he asserted,
opposed Parliamentary interference on economic grounds, but this very
opposition gave yeomen and mechanics the opportunity and rhetoric to
press for more radical democratic reforms at the expense of both the
imperial and domestic ruling classes. Not long after, J. Franklin Jameson
provided a comprehensive version of this picture in The American Revolution Considered As A Social Movement.34 Charles Beard's already pervasive
view that the Federal Convention codified a Thermidorian victory of the
propertied classes over revolutionary radicalism seemingly confirmed the
notion that the Progressive approach could account for the entire era.35
Accordingly, serious concern for the actual constitutional arguments
that Americans had employed all but vanished. Schlesinger himself
sounded the theme in claiming that far from being a great forensic controversy over abstract governmental rights, aristocratic resistance to British policy was "contemptuous, if not fearful, of disputes upon question [s]
of abstract right[s]."36 Subsequent studies by Becker and Randolph G.
Adams would go further in suggesting that American constitutional arguments shifted to suit American economic needs.37 No other plausible
explanation seemed to account for claims that Parliament had no authority to levy an "internal" tax like the Stamp Act, only later to oppose the
Townshend duties by denying Parliament any authority to tax at all, only
at last to oppose the Boston Port Act with the argument that Parliament
lacked even the authority to legislate. Further stops on the road to skepticism came in the years leading to World War II with John C. Miller's Sam
Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda and Philip Davidson's Propaganda and the
American Revolution.38 As the titles implied, these works treated patriot
rhetoric as a device to manipulate public opinion in the service of deeper
economic motives. This assessment accorded with the times, as the Great

Depression spawned totalitarian regimes that seemed to have perfected
propaganda as just this type of device. From the viewpoint of historical
plausibility, the thesis more importantly dovetailed with the Progressive
33. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, The American Revolution Reconsidered, 34 Pol. Sci.
Q. 61 (1919).

34. See J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered as a So
Movement (1973).

35. See Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States (1986).

36. Schlesinger, supra note 33, at 66-71.

37. See Carl L. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of
Political Ideas (1958); Randolph G. Adams, The Political Ideas of the American Revolution
(1958).

38. See Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1
(1941); John C. Miller, Sam Adams: Pioneer in Propaganda (1960).
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tale of domestic aristocrats resisting Britain for economic reasons, only to
see the fight co-opted by democratic radicals who had economic scores of
their own to settle. Prophets shunned in their own land at least have the

comfort of being ahead of their time. The triumph of the Progressive
conception robbed the patriots' ghosts of even this solace.
The fortunes of American constitutionalism in many ways returned
to square one with the ascent of a new kind of social history in the after-

math of the Second World War. Here inspiration, in part, also came
from Germany, in the form of Max Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of

Capitalism,39 and, in part, from England through the work of such
Cambridge scholars as Peter Laslett and Quentin Skinner.40 Mostly,
though, influential approaches issued from the French Annales School, in
large part consolidated by Fernand Braudel.41 In Europe, these strategies
turned to social history as nothing less than a means for "compre-

hend [ing] past society in its totality,"42 especially the relationship of environment to economic development, family life, and everyday existence.

In America, these developments prompted historians to view early
America as a society, or societies, to be explained for its own sake rather

than as a prelude to independence. As Joyce Appleby recently observed,
"early American historians of the last generation have attached themselves to a European frame of reference that, perversely, has had a liberat-

ing effect on their scholarship."43
What resulted is the return of American constitutional thought to
the margins, amidst an exploration of social history far richer than anything the Progressives could have imagined. Local studies by scholars like
Philip Greven and Kenneth Lockridge still stand as early landmarks reflecting new concerns for comprehensive social study.44 Such historians

as Gary Nash, Winthrop Jordan, Peter Wood, and Francis Jennings, a
number of whom also employed new and imaginative techniques, likewise attempted to recapture the experiences of African-Americans and

39. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Talcott Parsons
trans., 1958).

40. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 Hist.
& Theory 3 (1969). See generally, Appleby, supra note 18, at 248-49, 261 (discussing the
influence of scholars such as Weber and Skinner in examining history through social
structures).

41. The name derives from the journal, Annales: Economies, Sociites, Civilizations, which
highlighted the group's work. For an account of the Annales school, see Traian

Stoianovich, French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm (1976).
42. Appleby, supra note 18, at 248.
43. Id. at 245.

44. See Philip J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land, and Family in

Colonial Andover, Massachusetts (1970); Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town, the

First Hundred Years: Dedham, Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (1970); see generally John M.
Murrin, Review Essay, 11 Hist. & Theory 226 (1972) (reviewing Greven and Lockridge,
among others).
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Native Americans.45 More recently still, Carol Karlsen, Nancy Cott, and
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich have done the same for women.46 This new
mainstream may indeed be "liberating" for early American history in gen-

eral. But it is not hard to see how a mainstream that places a premium on
social history in the first instance, and minimizes the importance of the
Revolution in the second, at best returns the constitutional commitments
of American patriots to a state of salutary neglect. A number of historians, moreover, worked to insure that this situation did not remain "at
best." New Left scholars like Jesse Lemisch and Gary Nash merged older
Progressive stances with Annales School approaches to argue that the driving force behind the commitment to self-government came not only from
the ideas of the elite but from the concerns of sailors, artisans, the urban
poor, and the otherwise "inarticulate" as well.47
III. REDISCOVERING AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

Whatever else prompts many constitutional theorists to fumble the
history of the Founding, the lack of historical scholarship is no longer
one of them. At least such is the case with regard to the origins of Ameri-

can constitutionalism.48 For the past two generations, historians have
produced studies of imagination and rigor that have rediscovered first
the ideological and then the legal world in which early American constitutionalism emerged. The result is an immense body of work that provides theorists an unprecedented opportunity to recapture for themselves
the experience and ideas present at the creation of our constitutional
45. See Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the
Cant of Conquest (1975); Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes
Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (1977); Gary B. Nash, Red, White, and Black: The Peoples
of Early America (1974); Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South
Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion (1974).
46. See Carol F. Karlsen, The Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial
New England (1987); Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood: "Woman's Sphere" in
New England, 1780-1835 (1977); Laurel T. Ulrich, A Midwife's Tale: The Life of Martha
Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-1812 (1990).

47. See Jesse Lemisch, The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up, in
Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History 3 (Barton J. Bernstein ed.,
1968); Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of
Revolutionary America, 25 Wm. & Mary Q. 371 (3rd ser. 1968); Gary B. Nash, Social
Change and the Growth of Prerevolutionary Urban Radicalism, in The American
Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism 3 (Alfred F. Young ed.,
1976).

48. Though beyond the scope of this Article, another candidate in this regard is work
on the Civil War and Reconstruction. A select but by no means exhaustive list of important

studies includes: Chester J. Antieau, The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1981); Michael K Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's
Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (1988); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863
(1986); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to
Judicial Doctrine (1988).
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order. Coming to grips with this opportunity first requires some idea of
how it came about, especially the critical yet undervalued role played by

scholarship on the Revolution. Appreciating this opportunity likewise requires considering at least the main works and themes this scholarly renaissance has produced.
A. The Constitutional Origins of American Independence
Before American constitutional thought could be taken seriously,
American thought in general had to be taken seriously. And before that
could happen, American thought in general simply had to be taken into
account. One of the first works to attempt this claimed to do it all. In The
Liberal Tradition in America, Louis Hartz reduced the American societyand with it both the Revolution and the Constitution-to a tale of unique
liberal consensus grounded in the political philosophy of John Locke.49

Perfectly pitched for Eisenhower's America, Hartz's message was that
"Locke dominates American political thought as no thinker dominates

the political thought of a nation."50 For Hartz, Lockean thought meant a
system that enshrined individual rights, laid the groundwork for capitalism, and left a legacy of moderate political discourse. On this view, the

Revolution became a happy anomaly and the Constitution a blueprint for
a stable liberal democracy. The Revolution and Constitution also became
symbols of a general American exceptionalism against the backdrop of a
Europe historically plagued by royalism and radicalism. That American
liberalism rested on the shoulders of an English philosopher was less a

contradiction than a paradox, since it was America's nonfeudal past that
permitted it to embrace Locke more fully than any other nation. In that

embrace, Locke became American.
Hartz's liberal account, however, proved to be too grand an explanation based upon too little investigation. In short order the vision of
America as an applied version of the Two Treatises of Government5l fell vic-

tim to exacting scholarly criticism by specialists in early American history.
Too seldom noted in this regard is The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolu-

tion, by Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan.52 This work would have signaled a new tack had it done nothing more than provide a detailed survey

of the principal American claims against Parliament as expressed in
speeches, pamphlets, resolutions, and newspaper articles.53 But Stamp Act
49. See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of
American Political Thought since the Revolution (1955).
50. Id. at 140.

51. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988)
(3d ed. 1698).

52. See Edmund S. Morgan & Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to
Revolution (1953).

53. Edmund Morgan underscored the importance of reclaiming the colonists'
position by editing a selection of the principal sources. See Prologue to Revolution:
Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766 (Edmund S. Morgan ed.,
1959).
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Crisis did more. The Morgans
tions-economic, legal, and constitutional. As part of this endeavor they
also challenged the Imperial School's view that the Grenville ministry,
which imposed the Stamp Act on the colonies, had given the colonies a

e

genuine opportunity to vote financial contributions to the Empire, and

its corollary-that the American failure to do so represented mere
tightfistedness.54

Most importantly, Stamp Act Crisis closely scrutinized the American
constitutional case that Parliament lacked the authority to tax the colonies. In accomplishing this, the Morgans refuted the notion that
Americans had objected merely to "internal" taxes, only to reverse their
position the moment the Townshend duties imposed "external" taxes.
Rather, they contended that the colonists adopted a principled position
that would remain consistent throughout the Anglo-American controversy. Nor, in contrast to Hartz, did the Morgansjettison Progressive con-

cerns. Stamp Act Crisis took pains to demonstrate the complex interplay
between the leaders of American resistance and the crowds that prevented the Stamp Act from being enforced, an interplay producing a
shared concern with Parliament's constitutional encroachments. In this
way, their volume at once declined to write the less well-to-do out of the
story entirely and anticipated New Left calls to examine the motivations

of just these groups. Taken together, the lessons of the Stamp Act controversy promised a radically new approach to the Anglo-American crisis
in general. The "Prologue to Revolution" thus promised also to serve as a
prologue to scholarship.
Making good on that promise in the first instance fell to Bernard
Bailyn. Bailyn happened into this task by serving as the editor of

Pamphlets of the American Revolution,55 a projected multi-volume colle
that has yet to go past the first volume, but that required Bailyn to immerse himself in the massive polemical literature that the American opposition produced. Nor was he alone, for what here appears as happenstance was in fact part of a larger trend. Apart from the Morgans, other
scholars were also turning to the pamphlets of the day with fresh eyes. In
particular, Caroline Robbins had already immersed herself in the im-

mense polemical literature produced by a marginal yet persistent English
opposition to the eighteenth-century Parliament. Rather than a collec-

tion, her efforts yielded the important monograph The Eighteenth-Century
Commonwealthman.56 The significance of the work lay not in any thesis
Robbins advanced; it lay instead in the sheer vastness of her subject, one
she set out in encyclopedic fashion. Her further implication, that the
fervent writings of men like Robert Molesworth, John Trenchard,
54. For an example of the Imperial School, see, e.g., Andrews, supra note 25, at
133-41.

55. See 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1765 (Bernard Bailyn ed.,
1965).

56. See Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman (1959).
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Thomas Gordon, and Lord Bolingbroke somehow mattered, was not lost

on Bailyn.
Bailyn transformed his own expertise into more pointed interpreta-

tion. The result was the seminal Ideological Origins of the American Revolution.57 This famous volume is not three paragraphs old before it commits
the ritual sacrifice of its forebears, declaring that "the American Revolution was above all else an ideological, constitutional, political struggle and

not primarily a controversy between social groups."58 Principles mattered, and it was Parliament's violation of those principles which the
Americans held dear that prompted their eventual rebellion. The
precepts that mattered most derived from nearly all the sources Ameri-

cans could get their hands on, running the full range of "Enlightenment
abstractions and common law precedents, covenant theology, and classi-

cal analogy-Locke and Abraham, Brutus and Coke."59 The harmonizing force for these voices, the "framework" within which they could all be
"brought together into a comprehensive theory," was the very same Com-

monwealth thought salvaged by Robbins.60 Viewed through this medium, the regulations that Parliament sought to impose after 1763 took
on a sinister spin. In the logic of the Commonwealth ideology, proposals
for an American episcopate, perceived constitutional violations such as
the Stamp Act, royal opposition to colonial proposals giving American
judges life tenure, the suppression of John Wilkes, and the landing of
British troops in Boston, all pointed inexorably to a conspiracy against

English liberty mounted by a venal ministry. It was to prevent enslavement to this corrupt junto that more than any other reason led the
Americans to take up arms.
In all of this, constitutional arguments at last play a role, but only a

subsidiary and ambiguous one. For Bailyn it matters that the colonists

believed certain Parliamentary measures exceeded limits on its authority

and violated guarantees of colonial rights based upon constraints higher
than any Act of Parliament itself. Yet these beliefs mattered in the same
way that worry about an American episcopate mattered. They counted
not so much because they could have prompted resistance, but because

they served as evidence of a "deliberate assault of power upon liberty."'61
Why Bailyn treats constitutional principles this way is not hard to guess.
Ideological Origins never deals with the issue of how sound American constitutional arguments were. It does, to be sure, describe measures such as
the Stamp Act as "unconstitutional taxing." Approving references to certain historians who did express views on the matter, however, suggest that
Bailyn did not find much reason to challenge the conclusion of the Impe-

57. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1967).
58. Id. at vi.

59. Id. at 54.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 117.
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rial School that the colonists were simply wrong on the law.62 The preface to the "silver anniversary" edition of Ideological Origins makes this suggestion more strongly. In this update, Bailyn states that the
revolutionaries concluded that the preservation of their freedom re-

quired "the destruction of the political and constitutional system that had
hitherto governed them."63 This statement does not easily square with
the view that the colonists made a plausible constitutional case. Instead it
implies that the colonists put forth claims that were legally dubious, that
they lost on the merits, and that they had no choice but to free themselves of the settled constitutional framework. Yet implication does not
amount to a considered argument, despite the conclusions that scholars
commonly attribute to Bailyn's work. Ideological Origins can be read for
the proposition that what the colonists perceived to be constitutional violations were no more than that-their own perceptions. However, nothing in the book forecloses the finding that the American and British conceptions of the constitution, each of them tenable, simply diverged.

The same goes for Gordon S. Wood's magisterial Creation of the American Republic.64 In part this is because Creation is chiefly a study of the
Critical Period and Founding rather than the Revolution. In the main it
picks up just where Ideological Origins leaves off, examining how American

ideology after 1776 shaped the Federal Constitution. From here Creation
makes its central point: The newly independent American citizenry experimented with radically republican state constitutions, only to reject
the conventional understandings on which they were based and to invent
"a new science of politics" that culminated in the Federal Constitution.65

This claim, to say nothing of Wood's encyclopedic research, has greatly
influenced how historians have approached the period ever since. This is

not to say that many of the book's assertions have gone unchallenged.66
Nor has the book garnered a monopoly. In particular, Forrest
McDonald, whose earlier work did much to clear the way for ideologica
minded historians, offers a significantly less tidy account of ideological
development in his important Novus Ordo Seclorum.67 No one, however,

62. Id. at 94-143.
63. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution vii (enlarged

ed. 1992) (1967).
64. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31, and infra text accompanying notes
102-114.

66. For a critique of Creation from a number of perspectives, see generally Forum:

The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews,

44 Wm. & Mary Q. 549 (3rd ser. 1987).
67. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the
Constitution (1985).
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has seriously challenged the essentials of Creation's central claim;68 nor
has anyone removed Creation from its preeminent place in the field.69
Despite its focus, or perhaps because of it, Wood's project demonstrated the debt that study of the Constitution's origins owed to the rediscovery of Revolutionary thought. For one immediate yet symbolic thing,

Wood's work began as a follow-up study to the work of Bailyn, who served
as Wood's dissertation advisor. More importantly, Wood's work-and for
that matter, McDonald's-proceeds on the premise that the ideas underlying the Constitution cannot be understood without also understanding
the constitutional ideas that came before. Creation therefore commences

with a background treatment of the political thought that led to the
Revolution.70 There Wood generally follows his mentor; while noting
that the colonists perceived constitutional violations, he generally fails to
assess the worth of those claims.71 To do this would have required Wood,

or Bailyn, not only to resurrect the colonists' ideology, but to reconstruct
contemporary constitutional law as well. This task by its nature requires

not only considerable research, but legal training as well. Thus, it would
fall to others.

Just as it was doing so, one further landmark work of ideological history appeared. This was The Machiavellian Moment by J.G.A. Pocock.72
Pocock's work stands alongside the studies of Bailyn and Wood insofar as
it, too, takes the ideas of the revolutionaries and their constitution-mak-

ing successors seriously. But unlike that of Bailyn and Wood, Pocock's
orientation had less to do with rejecting the Progressives or challenging

Hartz than with seeking to examine the language of politics as "a social
construction of reality that determines how men and women interpret

events, assign value, and decide to act."73 In this Pocock looked to Europe, specifically to those Cambridge scholars who were attempting to
uncover deep societal structures generally.74
This commitment led Pocock to make central a particular body of
thought that Bailyn and Wood had portrayed as simply important. For
Pocock, American revolutionary thought in particular, and early Ameri68. McDonald, who is quick to point out his disagreements with Wood, see id. at 67
n.25, nonetheless agrees that the Constitutional Convention in large part arose as a
response to perceived excesses of the state governments and that it produced a document
reflecting a fundamental departure in political thought. See id. at 143-83.

69. See Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicentennial, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1565,
1594-97 (1987) (hailing Wood's Creation as "the most influential single work of historical
scholarship on the Founding Period to appear in the past two decades").

70. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 3-45. So, too, does McDonald. See
McDonald, supra note 67, at 1-142.
71. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 10-45. Wood does, however, suggest that
American views of the English constitution were idiosyncratic. See id. at 13-15.

72. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and
the Atlantic Republican Tradition (1975).

73. Appleby, supra note 18, at 263.

74. See id. at 247-48, 261.
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can ideas in general, were "country"-or as the term was later recast, "republican." By this Pocock meant that early Americans spoke a conceptual
language in which individuals gained meaning as citizens committed to
the common enterprise of self-government. Much of The Machiavellian
Moment traces the pedigree of this intellectual heritage through the
English political thought that flourished during the Commonwealth period of the seventeenth century to Niccolo Machiavelli's rediscovery of
the classical Greek polis in Renaissance Italy. In England, this republican

or "country" ideology did constant battle with the "court" ideology usually
advocated by those who controlled the central apparatus of government.

But in America nearly all was "country" thought.75 Thus, when various
"court" measures like the Sugar and Stamp Acts issued forth, American
colonists inevitably assessed and opposed them on the basis of their re-

publican understandings.76
As Daniel Rodgers has explained, the republican model put forth

by Pocock, in particular-met many scholarly needs and gained swift ascendancy.77 But it also created its own problems. Since most historians
ultimately conceded that America eventually became the land of liberalism that Hartz said it was, Pocock's republicanism spawned an increasingly "acrid" debate as to when and on what level of society the transformation from republicanism to liberalism occurred.78 Despite this
challenge, or perhaps because of it, Pocock's republicanism became the
historical model of choice for legal academics arguing their own points
with reference to early America.79

With respect to the arguments that patriots actually made, however,
the republican model left out a good deal. Much of what was left out was

clear from the start, such as religion and culture generally.80 Much was
only becoming clear, namely the law. Central in this latter category was

the work of historians who were often located down the same hall from
75. See Pocock, supra note 72, at 525 (stating that "[t] here was no American Court").
76. See id. at 506-52.

77. See Rodgers, supra note 20, at 11-38.

78. See Rodgers, supra note 20, at 33. See generallyJoyce Appleby, Liberalism and
Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (1992); Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism
and Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. & Mary Q. 334 (3rd ser. 1982) (discussing the
clash of current scholarly views regarding the place of republicanism in early America);
Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 Wm. & Mary Q. 4
ser. 1972) (discussing the evolution of a dominant view of the role of republicanism in
early American history).

79. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 20, at 17-55; Sherry, supra note 20, at 550-62,
574-79; Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 20, at 30 n.7; see generally Abrams, supra
note 20 (criticizing the use that legal scholars have made of historical research on
republicanism); Rodgers, supra note 20, at 33-34.

80. In Rodgers's phrase, the republican model "squeezed out massive domains of
culture." Rodgers, supra note 20, at 17. One stunning omission was religion, the point of
Edmund S. Morgan's famous essay, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 24
Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (3rd ser. 1967).
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the constitutional theorists who embraced republicanism. Among those

still too often neglected in this regard areJulius Goebel, Thomas C. Grey,
Barbara Black, and John Phillip Reid. The legal backgrounds of these
historians set them apart from those historians associated with the Imperial School who (except for the Morgans) had last examined constitutional questions. Many of those earlier scholars, including Charles H.
McIlwain, Robert Livingston Schuyler, and Andrew C. McLaughlin, were

professors of government or history.8' The legal historians would also set
themselves apart from their predecessors in another way. Whereas the

earlier group generally saw American constitutional claims as dubious,
the more the later group learned, the more it disagreed. Their conclusions, however, usually appeared in the backwaters of legal publications.

It would take time before they would find their way into the historical
mainstream.82
Reexamining American constitutional claims first meant rehabilitating them. Doing this, in turn, required culling the "touch of rightness" in

McIlwain's original thesis. This phrase comes from Barbara Black's important article, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colo-

nists."83 Black's essay refuted the seemingly irrefutable notion that
Schuyler's citation of medieval precedents in which Parliament bound
dependencies outside the realm belied McIlwain's assertion that Parliament never legislated for the dependencies before the colonies were set-

tled. Black countered with the critical point that Parliament in the Mid-

dle Ages made laws as the King's Council rather than as a representative

body.84 This conciliar model had only begun to change to a representative one by the time the colonial settlement took place. Schuyler consequently attributed the acts of Parliament, the royal council, to its nominal
but not functional successor, Parliament, the legislature. "Constitution of
Empire" did much to repeal Schuyler as the last word, and to revivify
McIlwain's main contention. When the colonists first left England, the
only imperial authority over them that was beyond question lay with the
King and his Council. American patriots were not necessarily "wrong on
the law" after all.85

But this did not mean that they were right, either. Parliament, perhaps, could not have established imperial authority as a legislature when
English settlers began their conquest of the New World. On the eve of
the Revolution, however, the English constitutional world had changed.
The twin turning points of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Han-

81. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29 (discussing views of McIlwain, Schulyer,
and McLaughlin).

82. For a thoughtful survey, see jack P. Greene, From the Perspective of Law:
and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S. Atlantic Q. 56 (1986).
83. See Black, supra note 28.

84. See id. at 1171.

85. See id. at 1170-72.
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overian Succession of 171486 signalled that Parliament, at least domestically, had made the shift from a subordinate advisory body to a dominant
legislative one.87 For the dependencies, this shift could have produced
one of two general corollaries: either Parliament would fill the vacuum
left by the retreating monarchy and simply replace the crown as the sovereign overseas policymaker, or it would follow the constitutional principles
on which it claimed its own power against the monarchy and defer to
local representative assemblies outside the realm. Parliament not surprisingly opted to fill the vacuum by laying claim to the crown's imperial
authority. By the time of the American Revolution, respectable Parliamentary advocates could argue that Britain's legislature was not subject
even to constitutional limits that had previously bound the monarch
either in or beyond the realm.

It still does not follow that American Whigs were wrong in arguing
the contrary position. Parliament's assertion of its authority alone did
not establish its legitimacy. Then as now, the United Kingdom lacked any
mechanism for the authoritative resolution of constitutional conflicts.
The answer to which side was "right on the law" can thus never be known

in the sense of looking up a considered decision handed down by an
ostensibly impartial tribunal. Despite the lack of a "Supreme Court," or
perhaps because of it, a vast body of constitutional discourse existed
against which American and British claims could be considered. The
question for the new breed of constitutional scholars was not therefore

which side was "correct." Rather, the query was whether American patriots asserted sound claims as measured by the accepted constitutional
principles of the day.

The answer to this question has been a resounding yes, and no historian has been more resolute in articulating it than John Phillip Reid. For
over three decades Reid has kept the legal and academic presses humming with articles, reviews, and monographs too numerous to mention.88
86. In 1714, the Elector of Hanover, a German prince, acceded to the British throne
upon the death of Queen Anne, to become King George I. George's accession marked the
end of the Stuart dynasty. See generally H.T. Dickinson, Walpole and the Whig Supremacy
45-49, 70-71, 113-14, 121-26 (1973).

87. For a discussion of the shift and its consequences, see Flaherty, supra note 28.
88. A Reid sampler includes the following: The Apparatus of Constitutional Advocacy

and the American Revolution: A Review of Five Books, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 187 (1967); In a
Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in Law, and the Coming of the
American Revolution, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1043 (1974); In Accordance With Usage: The
Authority of Custom, The Stamp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American Revolution,
45 Fordham L. Rev. 335 (1976); In Legitimate Stirps: The Concept of "Arbitrary," the
Supremacy of Parliament, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 5 Hofstra L. Rev.
459 (1977); In Defiance of the Law: The Standing-Army Controversy, the Two
Constitutions, and the Coming of the American Revolution (1981); In a Defiant Stance:
The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts Bay, the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the
American Revolution (1977); The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American
Revolution (1988); The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American Revolution
(1989).
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If there is anything in the field to rival Reid's prolific output it is his own
encyclopedic command of constitutional sources, whether case law, official pronouncements, or pamphlets. Reid puts both his persistence and

learning on display in his multi-volume Constitutional History of the Ameri-

can Revolution,89 which also represents the culmination of the long effort
to resurrect American constitutional arguments.

To begin with, Reid shows that the colonial case was far more than
just tenable. American Whigs, he argues, espoused what might be termed

a "Commonwealth" version of the English Constitution that was
grounded in traditional concepts already commonplace by the seven-

teenth century. Under this constitution any sovereign power-including
Parliament-labored under numerous limits designed to safeguard a

well-known and well-defined set of English rights. The constraints included: the consent of the governed; various fundamental contracts, first
between the ruler and the ruled, and then between the ruler and those
sent out to colonize new lands; custom, in the sense of practices that over
time had acquired their own authority; and various binding precedents

and analogies. The set of rights included property, jury trials, personal

security, and freedom from arbitrary government90
Reid's development of these themes challenges the understandings
of previous generations of historians. In particular, he argues that
neither Locke nor "natural law" framed American constitutional discourse. As a corollary, he contends that, at least in England, a different
version of the Constitution must have developed to do combat with the

Commonwealth-or seventeenth-century-version.9' Otherwise, there
would not have been the constitutional battle that took place. Especially
within the ministry, the constitutional vision that emerged supplanted the
concept of constraints with a newer "Absolutist Constitution" that called

for Parliament's supremacy and ultimately, its sovereignty. In this way
Reid at least implicitly turns the traditional view upside down. If anything, Constitutional History hints, the older version of the English Constitution is the better one.
Legal historians also push their conclusions to a different logical extreme, and once more no one does it more forcefully than Reid. Each

volume of Constitutional History begins with the disclaimer that the project
speaks only to constitutional aspects of the Revolution, and not to its social, economic, or political causes. This is, however, a caveat honored
only in the breach. Throughout his work Reid writes as if the constitutional aspects explain all. Frequently he says as much. "What America

89. See generally John P. Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution

(1986-93). The project consists of four volumes: 1 The Authority of Rights (1986); 2 The

Authority to Tax (1987); 3 The Authority to Legislate (1991); 4 The Authority of Law
(1993).
90. See 1 id. passim.

91. On this point, and certain questions it raises, see Eben Moglen, Book Review, 9
Law & Hist. Rev. 389, 391-92 (1991).
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was constitutionally compelled to defend," he at one point opines, "the
British could not constitutionally concede. The difference might be a
mere abstraction of law, but once stated, civil war was inescapable."92 In
this way Reid and his fellow legalists turn the traditional view upside down
once more. Where earlier historians saw a revolution accounting for constitutional rhetoric, legal historians see constitutional rhetoric accounting
for a revolution.

Whether anyone else will is another question. Not long ago, the

growing body of work by legal historians began to filter its way into the
awareness of historians generally. Much credit for this translation must
go to Jack P. Greene, who was among the first "mainstream" historians to
appreciate the work of the Legal School.93 Recently he went a step further and, with Peripheries and Center, presented an extended sketch of the
main themes constitutional scholars have been emphasizing.94 For reasons unclear, however, Greene's work appears to have served as a summa-

tion rather than as an invitation to further work. At any rate, so it seems
with regard to those historians who first suggested that Americans may
have meant what they said. For his part, Bailyn long ago left the field of
ideas to concentrate instead on social movements in the literal sense.95
Wood has followed suit.96 Even Greene hasjoined what appears to be the
ongoing Annales preoccupation with social history.97 This development is
ironic in many ways, not least because constitutional history requires
much more to be done.

B. Constitutional Reconstruction

What has been done nonetheless allows for certain conclusions.
First, the current reconstruction of early American constitutionalism permits a more complete picture of the Revolution. But the import of this

project does not stop at 1776, because the more complete picture that
the Legal School permits in turn illuminates the received account of

American thought leading to the Constitution. That is, a received account that centers around the work of Gordon Wood, which is itself the

product of the past generation's turn toward the study of ideas, and a
92. 2 Reid, supra note 89, at 282.

93. See Greene, supra note 82, at 56-77.
94. See Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the
Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (1986).
95. See generally Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America (1986);
Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of
the Revolution (1986).

96. See generally Wood, Radicalism, supra note 13. While this work powerfully

complements Wood's earlier Creation of the American Republic, it does so by focusing on
themes of culture and economics rather than constitutional principles.

97. See generally Jack P. Greene, Imperatives, Behaviors, and Identities: Essays in
Early American Cultural History (1992);Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social
Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture
(1988).
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version of which has already worked its way into the thought of numerous

constitutional theorists. This enhanced understanding in turn should ultimately yield a richer historical backdrop against which to critique the
work of these theorists.
Americans, it now seems clear, marched towards independence

armed with a coherent and tenable constitutional brief. This brief consisted of a set of principles, derived from the English Constitution of the
previous century, which emphasized constraints on government authority
in order to protect traditional English rights, and which tied governmen-

tal legitimacy to representation.98 Seen from one perspective, the evident commitment to rights might be termed "liberal." In this regard, the
constitution the Americans advanced was fully consistent with Locke, and
at times augmented with Lockean references, though as Reid has tire-

lessly argued, it owed little to the philosopher directly. Seen from another perspective, though, the patriot constitution appears "republican"
in its devotion to representation and self-rule.
But in truth either label has its problems, a point understood by

those historians-many of whom are often labeled "republican"-who
first delved into these matters seriously. As Bailyn pointed out in Ideologi-

cal Origins, Americans drew from a multitude of traditions that may look
contradictory today, but did not at the time.99 Wood himself has never
fully abandoned the point, stating just recently that the question whether
republicanism or liberalism dominated in late eighteenth-century
America is not only "badly put [but also] . . . assumes a sharp dichotomy
between two clearly identifiable traditions that eighteenth-century reality

will not support .... Jefferson, for example, could believe simultaneously
and without any sense of inconsistency in the likelihood of America's becoming corrupt and in the need to protect individual rights from government."'00 What mattered to the patriots was not the conflict of two distinct conceptions of government, still less the dominance of any one.

What mattered, rather, was Westminster's violation of a plausible constitutional framework under which these and other conceptions had a
place. 101
Independence changed this. For one thing, it rode in tandem with

an armed struggle that placed a premium on public spirit, virtue, and

sacrifice of individual interests for the greater good.102 For another, it
deprived Americans of exactly the constitution on which they had relied
in making their case against Westminster. Gone was the monarch; gone

was the aristocracy; and so, gone was any hope of replicating the "mixed

98. See infra text accompanying notes 100-107.
99. See generally Bailyn, supra note 63.

100. Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 Wm. & Mary
Q. 628, 634 (3rd ser. 1987).
101. See 4 Reid, supra note 89, at 3-8.

102. See generally Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental
Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (1979).

This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Wed, 20 Dec 2017 23:36:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

1995]

HISTORY

"LITE"

547

government" of which Britons were so proud. The only familiar materials
remaining lay in the legislature, and from these the logical structures to

build were republics as classically understood. Thus even Daniel
Rodgers, who is mostly bemused by republicanism's academic faddishness, is open to the possibility that the "cognitive roadmap" it can provide
may be "effective in describing a revolutionary moment," whatever its difficulties in accounting for the "quarrels and compromises of normal
politics."1103
The constitutional commitments Americans brought to independence underscore many scholarly themes about how those commitments
developed subsequently. The most influential theme, pioneered by
Wood, holds that while "republican principles" may not have "dominated" in a sharply defined contest with liberalism, they did account for
much that occurred in the first flush of state constitution-making after

May 10, 1776.104 In rhetoric, republican precepts became manifest in the
idealization of the states as "Christian Sparta," in growing anxiety about
American virtue, and in marshalling religion and education to insure that

such virtue as did exist endured.'05 In structure, these led to an emphasis
on representation. Nowhere was this tendency better highlighted than in

the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution, which featured a one-house legislature, annual elections, a multiple executive, and the posting of bills for

public debate.'06 In each provision republican precepts led to a
marginalization of the notion that a constitution meant external con-

straints on what government could do. That concept may have made
sense when reining in a monarch or unrepresentative Parliament. It

seemed less central in dealing with a state legislature ostensibly responsi-

ble to a virtuous citizenry.'07
From this critical point, scholarship on the constitutional thought
that preceded the Constitution also supplies a richer backdrop for considering the framing of the Constitution itself. Starkly put, the constitutional case that led to independence presumed that representative government and individual liberty complemented one another.
Independence revealed-and practically speaking, revealed for the first

time-that representative government could endanger rights rather than
protect them. This backdrop supports the central thesis in Wood's account that too many constitutional theorists somehow miss: that the Federalists who conceived the Constitution reacted to the excesses seen in

republican state governments by transforming the very concept of consti103. Rodgers, supra note 20, at 35.

104. On that date the Continental Congress recommended to the several colonies to

draft new constitutions. See Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781-89, at
58-59 (1987).
105. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 421-29.
106. See Pa. Const. of 1776, ?? 2, 9, 15, 19, 23; see also Wood, Creation, supra note
14, at 132-42.

107. See Wood, Creation supra note 14, at 162-88; Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the

People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America 239-62 (1988).
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tutionalism.108 This transformation rested in large part on the unhappy
insight that even the American citizenry could not be counted upon to

muster sufficient virtue to prevent the republican model from encroach-

ing on liberty.109 Its success in turn rested on the Federalists' ability to
offer a less republican framework by relocating sovereignty away from all
government, placing it instead in "We the People," whose approval during extraordinary times would give this new framework a more funda-

mental stamp of legitimacy.110 For some, the first part of this story confirms the Beardian notion that the Constitution heralded a Thermidorian
triumph which cleared the ground for a pluralistic land of self-interested,

liberal go-getters."11 For others, it confirms the persistence of the republican model for daily governance.112
Both assessments miss large points. The first overlooks the way in

which the great Federalist innovation of relocating sovereignty in "We the
People" arguably preserved a role for a republican politics of virtue in the
creation of constitutional norms. The second ignores Wood's main point
that the perceived failure of republicanism is what prompted the soon-to-

be Federalists to congregate at Annapolis in the first place. Either assessment, in short, misses the complexity of the Federalist achievement and

the possibility that it represented a synthesis of different traditions.
It is in this way that the scholarship concentrating upon the Revolu-

tion reenters the picture. For it seems not just plausible but likely that
Federalists drew both on the recent American understandings in creating

republican governments on the state level, and on their older conceptions of constitutionalism predating Independence. This point appears

108. Wood writes:

The Federalists' achievement was not in creating a totally new set of ideas, for this

they could never have done. Rather their achievement lay in their ability to bring
together into a comprehensive whole diffuse and often rudimentary lines of
thought, to make intelligible and consistent the tangles and confusions of
previous American ideas.

Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 564; see also id. at 519-615 (discussing the Federalists'

positions, as well as their campaign in favor of the Constitution); Morgan, supra note 107,
at 263-87 (discussing republicanism and the U.S. Constitution).
109. In The Federalist No. 10 Madison famously noted:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous

citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith and of public and personal
liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is

disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party,
but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.

The Federalist No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
110. See The Federalist No. 49, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 306-43; Morgan, supra note 107, at 267-77. For a
discussion of the modern theoretical implications of this point, see infra text
accompanying notes 188-191.

111. Richard Epstein in part adopts just this kind of account. See infra text

accompanying notes 162-187.
112. See supra note 20.
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doubly plausible insofar as this older brand of constitutionalism itself
combined various conceptions whose tensions would not become manifest until after 1776. On the institutional level, the patriot constitution
uniting local legislatures into a larger polity offered a precedent for fed-

eralism."13 More fundamentally, the patriot conception offered a strong
vision of a constitution serving as a constraint designed to protect tradi-

tional rights against the power of government, a conception at times
eclipsed in the flush of early state constitution-making, yet a vision that
nonetheless valued self-government as an end in itself. In this respect,
recent work on the many steps leading to 1787 contributes to a growing
literature that, taken together, views the Founding as a union of ideologi-

cal trends rather than the triumph of any one.'14
IV. HISTORIES "Lim"- To WEIGHTY
A. History and Theory

The rediscovery of early American constitutionalism, so long in coming, promised great things for modern American constitutionalism. After

decades of looking predominantly elsewhere, historians began at last to
take early American ideas seriously, and more recently even to treat early
American constitutional ideas respectfully. These efforts have for the first

time allowed a reconstruction of the constitutional thought underlying
the Revolution, which has in turn permitted a better understanding of
the Founding. Modern theorists inclined to rely on early American his-

tory'15 therefore found themselves presented with an unparalleled opportunity, and there was every reason to believe that they would seize it.

As Kathryn Abrams notes generally, "[1] egal scholars are natural scavengers," and here was much to scavenge."16 Daniel Rodgers has observed
more specifically that historians offered these rediscoveries of early American thought at a time when many theorists found these reconstructions

especially useful to their projects."17 In part this need arose because the
113. See Greene, supra note 94, at 91, 103, 172-74, 198-207.
114. For a list which is by no means comprehensive, see, e.g., Beyond Confederation:
Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity (Richard R. Beeman et al. eds.,
1987); McDonald, supra note 67; Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An
Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (1979); Richard R. Beeman, Deference,
Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America, 49
Wm. & Mary Q. 401 (3rd ser. 1992); Forum, supra note 66; James T. Kloppenberg, The
Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political
Discourse, 74J. Am. Hist. 9 (1987); Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The
Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (3rd ser. 1988); see also Bernstein, supra
note 69, at 1578-97 (discussing the complexity of recent work on the Founding).
115. The extent of this promise, of course, turns on the extent to which modem
theorists find it necessary to invoke history. The promise is therefore immense for thinkers
such as Ackerman, who find history dispositive in the derivation of constitutional
principles, but minuscule for writers like Dworkin, who invoke history almost not at all.
116. Abrams, supra note 20, at 1591.
117. See Rodgers, supra note 20, at 30-31.
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view of law as a self-sufficient discipline had begun to break down. In
larger part it arose from the challenge issued by politically conservative
originalists to derive constitutional principles from the intentions of the

Founders."18
In theory this turn to history is a good thing. Developing a norma-

tive case to defend why this is so, however, is a task better pursued elsewhere. For the purposes of the critique that follows, what matters is that
the individuals who introduce history into legal discourse to enhance
their claims are the theorists themselves. That said, some notion of why

history ought to be consulted in constitutional theory should be sketched,
lest any criticisms of how this has actually been done appear as an argu-

ment against doing it at all.
American constitutional theorists are correct to turn to the history of

the Founding for a number of reasons. Most generally, situating ideas in
the context in which they arose enables us to comprehend and assess
those ideas better than we would by viewing them as free-floating princi-

ples. This follows because the original historical setting almost invariably
suggests reasons to accept or reject a given idea that would not otherwise

be apparent. Understanding separation of powers as originally a consid-

ered response to majoritarian tyranny, for example, aids us in considering the doctrine's ongoing relevance, depending upon how serious we

believe the threat that gave rise to it continues to be."19 Beyond this,
contemporary theorists do well to reconstruct the ideas of the American
Founders in particular because these thinkers were not only individuals
of great ability-which may not set them apart from other thinkers-but

also because many of them spent two decades applying their principles
first to a resistance movement and then to the task of framing new gov-

ernments.'20 Having to face both tasks makes the Founders close to
unique. Finally, and most specifically, American theorists do well to turn

to our early constitutional history precisely because it is ours. As Ronald
Dworkin contends, a given theory should broadly comport with our con-

stitutional document and culture.'2' None of these reasons compels the
originalist view that the ideas of the Founders should be dispositive. They

do, however, confirm the almost universal historicist practice of turning
to those views for guidance.

118. This phenomenon has been especially apparent with regard to the Ninth
Amendment. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment,
64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 131, 134-39 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment:
Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1001, 1001 (1988). As Sherry
aptly notes, the "reactive foray into the origins of the ninth amendment-and to an even
greater extent, into the eighteenth century idea of unenumerated rights generally-has
rewarded historically-minded non-originalists beyond their wildest dreams." Id. at 1001.
119. For an excellent discussion developing these themes, see Don Herzog, Happy

Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 27-33 (1989).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 49-113.
121. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 140 (1985).
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Notwithstanding both the practical and normative incentives for appealing to the Founding, the promise of recent historical scholarship has
not been entirely fulfilled. A sampling of work by some of the most
prominent and productive constitutional theorists writing today reveals a
startling range of historical sophistication-running from the problematic, to the plausible, to the provocative.

Assessing how well a given theorist has relied on history presupposes
that there are standards for making this assessment. Those standards

most plausibly come from the discipline of history itself. This conclusion
follows not so much because historians determine what is historically
true,'22 but because they commonly resolve what is historically convincing. Constitutional interpretation is itself, after all, preeminently "a dis-

course of argument and persuasion."''23 Among the academics and professionals who make up the audience which constitutional theorists seek
to persuade, it is axiomatic that any argument drawing from another established discipline is convincing to the extent that it abides by the conventions of that discipline. As William Nelson argues, "At a theoretical
level, the assumption that scholarly standards can emerge out of a consensus of individual scholars with quite different ideological and aesthetic

preferences retains respectability today."''24 Likewise remaining respectable is a belief in specialization. University departments, professional associations, topical journals, and electronic mail "listservs" all testify to the
ongoing assumption that the overall community needs smaller groups of
experts to develop more specialized standards for the exploration of nar-

rower fields.'25 A final widespread assumption involves deference to
these groups of specialists. Perhaps even more dramatically than other
fields, the law has formalized this principle in relaxing the general evidentiary prohibition against opinion testimony for experts.'26
Consider a typical example involving legal theory and economics.

An academic lawyer seeks to advocate nonrestrictive corporate takeover
laws. To do so, she contends that, as a matter of economics, such a regime benefits shareholders with higher stock prices yet does not harm
employees through the migration ofjobs. She could base this contention
on personal anecdote, a citation to the Second Circuit, or the say-so of
her astrologer. Or she could rely on empirical studies-either her own,
or more realistically, those undertaken by economists-which abide by
122. Whether a matter can be deemed historically "true" in an objective sense need
not be resolved to assert the utility of historical standards. For a discussion on historical
objectivity, see Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the
American Historical Profession (1988); see also Thomas L. Haskell, Objectivity Is Not
Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick's That Noble Dream, 29 Hist. & Theory 129,
130 (1990) (disagreeing with Novick's assessment that objectivity as an ideal is essentially
confused).

123. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 695 (1987).
124. William E. Nelson, Standards of Criticism, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 447, 478 (1982).
125. See id. at 477.

126. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702 (providing for opinion testimony by expert witnesse
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established conventions of economic study.'27 It is hard to imagine any
legal theorist, regardless of her own scholarly practices, who would not

consider the last of these options as the most convincing.'28 Similar examples, moreover, could be drawn from the law's encounter with any

number of other disciplines.'29
History is no different, or at least not sufficiently different that its
conventions may be blithely ignored. A catalogue of such standards

might well partake of the prolixity of a graduate school bulletin.'30 For
present purposes, this catalogue need include only the most basic standards, if only because lawyers and legal scholars frequently make basic
mistakes. It may be edited down still further to mention just those basic
standards that appear to cause the legal community the most problems.
Of these, one set has to do with convincing historical methods. The
other has to do with convincing historical conclusions. Dressed up in
legal jargon, some historical standards sound in procedure, and others in
substance.

All sorts of "procedure" signify a persuasive historical assertion in the
making. Perhaps the most basic is simply getting elementary facts
straight.'3' Former Chief Justice Burger, for example, states in his origi127. This example is drawn from Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate
Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 856-60 (1993).
128. There is, in fact, a cottage industry of scholars who subject law and economics
works to economic critiques. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive
Economic Theory of Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1447, 1454 (1987) (reviewing William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (1987), paying
particular attention to positivist theory); see also CharlesJ. Goetz, Law and Economics:
Cases and Materials, 463-66 (1984) (emphasizing the professional utility of economic
literacy in the study of law); C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of
Law, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 4 (1975) (pointing out the inherent biases and inconsistencies in
the Posner school of law and economic methodology); Duncan Kennedy & Frank I.
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 712 (1980)
justifying private property and enforceable contract through economic analysis); MarioJ.
Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 642 (1980) (information
requirements in pursuit of the normative case for legal efficiency are so high as to render
such pursuit impractical).

129. Martha Nussbaum, for example, casts a cold eye on current lawyerly invocations
of philosophy, stating:

The professional standards of philosophy for philosophy are very different from
the standards applied to the philosophical articles one finds in such [law]
journals. Most of what I have read on emotion and empathy in the law, for
example, would not even get a very high grade as an undergraduate paper written
for a course of mine at Brown.

Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 Stan. L.
Rev. 1627, 1644 (1993).

130. For an attempt to set forth just some of these standards, see Powell, supra note
123, at 662-91.

131. I call getting a basic fact right a matter of "procedure" or method rather than
"substance" because the accuracy of such a fact does not reflect on the substance of a
larger assertion so much as indicate the methodological rigor underlying the assertion.
For example, getting right the exact date of the Puritan massacre of the Pequots near
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nal introduction to the "official" bicentennial edition of the U.S.

Constitution that "[t] he work of 55 men at Philadelphia in 1787 marked

the beginning of the end of the concept of the divine right of kings."''32
Now, many things can be said about what is wrong with this statement,
not the least of which is that "the concept of divine right of kings" ceased
to be a part of mainstream Anglophone political thought-and failed to
command a significant fringe-on either side of the Atlantic not long

after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and arguably earlier.'33 Moreover,
so distant was the Revolution-much less the Founding-from the divine
right of kings that, as noted, American patriots entered the fighting with
a constitutional understanding that denied the authority of Parliament
precisely because it posited a connection to the Empire through the au-

thority of a monarch considered on all sides to be limited by law.'34
Coming from a former Chief Justice of the United States in an official
publication issued to rekindle interest in the Constitution and its origins,

the statement is unfortunate.'135
More importantly, the legal community notoriously ignores the principle that the individual historical questions that its members commonly

seek to answer cannot be understood except as "part[ ] of a larger historical . . . whole."'36 Two methodological requirements follow. One is the
necessity of thorough reading, or at least citation, of both primary and
secondary source material generally recognized by historians as central to
a given question. Too often, legal scholars make a fetish of one or two
famous primary sources, and consider their historical case made.'37 An-

present-day Mystic, Connecticut, does not materially affect the thesis that English Settlers
from New England were bent on exterminating indigenous peoples. Getting it right,
however, would instill in the reader a certain confidence that the person making the
assertion about extermination knew what he or she was talking about. SeeJennings, supra
note 45, at 219-25.

132. Warren E. Burger, Foreword to The Constitution, the Law, and Freedom of

Expression, 1787-1987 (James B. Steward ed., 1987).
133. See Morgan, supra note 107, at 71-98.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.

135. For these and other errors in the former Chief Justice's introduction, see

Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1566-67; see generally Morgan, supra note 107, at 17-39
(discussing the fate of the doctrine of "divine right of kings" in Anglo-American political
thought).

William Nelson points out that this type of basic factual error is rare among legal
historians. See Nelson, supra note 124, at 482-85. Whether that is true of lawyers and
legal theorists, however, is another matter.

136. Powell, supra note 123, at 674.
137. This is a consistent problem, for example, in Paul Kahn's Legitimacy and History.
In particular, Kahn follows the lead of many a theorist before him to make sweeping points
about the Founding period based almost solely on The Federalist. More problematically, he
does so with virtually no direct citation to a secondary historical article or monograph. See
Kahn, supra note 7, at 9-31.

With regard to The Federalist generally, Richard Bernstein has aptly written, "To use
The Federalist as a means to understand the Constitution and its underlying philosophy is a
risk-laden pursuit, especially if undertaken for the purpose not of historical understanding
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other procedural corollary requires viewing, or at least attempting to
view, events, ideas, and controversies in- a larger context. Here legal
scholars, in what in its worst form is dubbed "law office history," notoriously pick and choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that serve

their purposes.'38 In a phrase, persuasive historical procedure dictates
genuine concern for facts, sources, and context. Abiding by just these

standards is hard and time-consuming work, often too hard and timeconsuming to meet the imperatives of legal scholarship.'39
Substantive concerns that signify convincing historical assertions

turn on the substantive area under consideration. If historical scholarship in a given area has settled on a certain account, or more likely, on a
framework for debate, historical assertions that acknowledge that account
or framework will simply be more persuasive. That, at least, is the case for
a history scholar; it is no less the case for a legal scholar arguing history.
Here the framework, if not the account, arises from exactly those schol-

arly achievements that resulted when American historians began to take
American ideology seriously. Its chief expositors, among others, include
Morgan, Bailyn, Wood, McDonald, Pocock, and Reid. Its main features
but of prescription for modern constitutional law and politics." Bernstein, supra note 69,
at 1588. For monographs that engage in this pursuit, see Vincent Ostrom, The Political

Theory of a Compound Republic (rev. ed. 1987); Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist,
and the Constitution 3-9, 193-207 (1987).
138. Robert Bork's Tempting of America is especially rich in just this type of
noncontextual historical assertion. One in particular arises in his argument that the
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not understand the privileges and immunities

clause to provide judicial protection for a range of fundamental liberties. This would have

been unthinkable, he contends, because "[t] he only significant exercise of judicial review
in the past century had been Dred Scott," which gave the notion of judicial review for the
protection of rights a bad name. Bork, supra note 6, at 181-82. But making an inference

from the undisputed fact that Dred Scott occurred is to slight several larger points that, in
context, make this ostensibly important fact at best irrelevant and at worst cut the other
way. The assertion overlooks that, by 1867, the North had won the Civil War and, in
controlling Congress and the judiciary, commanded the mechanisms for enforcing
national conceptions of fundamental rights dramatically different from a property right

over human beings. It ignores the expansive role lower Federal courts played in
Reconstruction. And it omits any even-glancing awareness that these and other matters

uncongenial to his conclusions have been central to the past generation of scholarship.
For sources addressing the larger context, see supra note 48.
139. Professor Powell ably articulates this challenge with reference to originalists
seeking to invoke the Founding:
We can understand the original meaning of the Constitution, in whole or in part,

only by "plunging [ourselves] into the systems of communication in which [the
Constitution] acquired meaning." If the originalist interpreter is unwilling or
unable to undertake this difficult and time-consuming task, either personally or
at least through intense familiarity with the original sources and scholarly
literature, he ought to drop the claim that he is conforming his constitutional

thought to that of the founders. The "law office history" of systematic
anachronism and quotation out of context is unconvincing advocacy and
unacceptable scholarship.

Powell, supra note 123, at 675 (citations omitted).
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emphasize the patriot constitutional case keyed to rights and representa-

tion, reaction and retrenchment.'40 This is not to say that this account or
framework will always be the only story. The Whigs, the Progressives, and

the Imperial historians, after all, had their day too. William Nelson
rightly argues that one sign of outstanding historical scholarship is work

that shifts a given substantive paradigm. 141 But, if the past is any guide,
that type of scholarship is not likely to come from constitutional theorists
with other lives to lead.

While the standards just sketched-procedural and substantive
provide a basis for a historical critique, they do not necessarily do anything more. In particular, they offer little if any guidance in assessing a
given theorist's ultimate normative claims. A particular constitutional
theory may hold, for example, that the events of the Founding are relevant in resolving constitutional questions, but that factors such as subsequent practice are dispositive. Under the terms of that type of theory,
even a miserable account of the Founding would only marginally affect

the normative answers put forward. That said, historical standards still
matter for the simple reason that, as noted, nearly every constitutional
theorist believes history adds something to her account. To the extent

that the history such theorists put forward falls short, whatever they had
hoped to add to their theoretical accounts evaporates. To the extent that
they want to recapture it, they must at least modify and, more likely, clarify their original historical assertions.

Weighed against these standards, the use of recent historiography in
legal theory has yielded mixed results. For a sense of that mix one need
turn no further than certain historical claims advanced by three of today's most prominent constitutional thinkers: Richard Epstein, Cass Sun-

stein, and Bruce Ackerman.'42 As will become clear, assessing historical
claims can take up as many pages as the claims themselves. Considering
how well any of these prolific scholars appeals to the past in his work
taken as a whole cannot be done in anything short of an extended study.
All that can be attempted here, therefore, is a critique of selected historical assertions. Such a project is legitimate so long as the selection is representative, or at least not misleading. Toward this end, the accounts to
be considered come only from each theorist's major works and deal with
the Founding in ways in which recent historical scholarship is directly
relevant.

Viewed together, the selected historical assertions which these scholars make replicate the pattern set by historians in the days before scholars
began taking early American discourse on its own terms. On one hand,
140. See supra text accompanying notes 52-97.
141. See Nelson, supra note 124, at 485-89.

142. As has been suggested, one could find any number of other constitutional
theorists with a habit of turning to history as well. See supra text accompanying notes
2-14. As will be seen, considering any more than just a few would require a monograph
rather than an article.
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Epstein, a champion of "neo-liberal" thinkers, invokes the eighteenth
century mainly with an eye to England, the better to argue for stringent
protection of individual contract and property rights. On the other
hand, Sunstein, a pioneer of "neo-republican" thought, invokes the

eighteenth century chiefly with a view toward what are ultimately Conti-

nental models, the better to promote a communitarian polity checked
less by claims of rights than by appeals to civic virtue and public-regarding

reason.'43 In between, Bruce Ackerman invokes the eighteenth century
to consider how the Founding generation itself sought to reconcile re-

ceived traditions in potentially novel ways, the better to advocate a framework that-at least in "normal" times-is neither primarily rights-based
nor entirely democratic.

B. The Strange Career of Liberal Constitutionalism
Some of the most influential works invoking the past fall into the
category of "neo-liberal."''44 Of these, perhaps the most important issue

from Richard Epstein, one of the academy's foremost defenders of property rights.'45 The sheer volume of Epstein's work-as with that of Sunstein and Ackerman-precludes a critique of his entire opus in a few
pages.'46 The impracticality of considering everything should not, how143. Interestingly, the "English/Continental" dichotomy inverts depending on
whether it is applied to constitutional theory or constitutional history. Thus, democratic
cmonists" commonly invoke English parliamentary models when making theoretical
arguments, but stress the works of polemicists who themselves looked to Italian and Greek
republics when making historical arguments. Conversely, "rights foundationalists"
commonly look to the Continent (Germany in particular) when they argue theory, but
invoke writers who themselves looked to English thinkers (Locke in particular) when they

assert history. This inversion occurs largely because the same thing happens with
historiography.

144. By this term I refer to "liberal" in its classical economic sense, that is, a
commitment to property rights against governmental attempts at physical takings,
economic regulation, or redistribution of wealth. I do not mean "liberal" in the
philosophical sense as articulated by, for example, John Rawls. See generally John Rawls,
Political Liberalism (1993).

145. For an account of modern case law on takings which builds on Epstein's
approach, see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 (1988). Epstein himself notes, critically
but with "odd comfort," Laurence Tribe's and Michael Dorf's "use of Lockean notions of
private property," similar to those put forward by Epstein, "in structuring the proper
interpretation of the Takings Clause." Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 699, 702 n.15 (1992) (citing Laurence H.
Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, 70-71 (1991)).
146. This opus includes the following: On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common
Property, 11 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, 17 (Summer 1994); The Federalist Papers: From Practical
Politics to High Principle, 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 13 (1993); Exit Rights Under
Federalism, 55 J.L. & Contemp. Probs. 147 (Winter 1992); A Common Lawyer Looks at

Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 145; The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1992); International News
Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law As Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L.
Rev. 85 (1992); The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 713
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ever, prevent the consideration of anything. In this light, two manageable candidates for present purposes are Epstein's important monograph,

Takings,'47 and his no less significant article, "Toward A Revitalization of
the Contract Clause."1148 Each study meets the criteria, previously noted,
for examination. Each is a major work in the author's body of scholarship. Each, moreover, makes historical claims about the Founding-and
for that matter about the eighteenth century generally-that invite con-

sultation of relevant historical studies. Whether a consideration of

stein's historical assertions in other works would yield different results
would depend on an examination of those works.

Unfortunately, an examination of the pertinent assertions in these
works shows history at something less than its weightiest. Procedurally,
Epstein's statements about the Founding and its context are conclusory.
Substantively, they would lead a casual observer to believe that nothing
much had changed in the study of early America since Louis Hartz. Now,
none of this may matter much for Epstein's ultimate theoretical conclu-

sions, if those conclusions in the end do not rest on his views of the

Founding or of history generally. But even if they do not, this hardly
means that the problems with Epstein's appeals to the past themselves do
not matter. To the contrary, they count precisely to the extent that

Epstein himself-rightly-invokes the authority of history to enhance, reinforce, and embellish his prescriptions. Any failure to make the relevant
historical assertions in a credible fashion diminishes his overall project in
just the proportion he hoped to strengthen it.
As it happens, Epstein's relationship with history, at least in the
works under scrutiny, is at best ambivalent. As an initial matter, he
evinces a certain skepticism about history in his explicit refusal to con-

sider how the Founding generation might have specifically understood or
applied the constitutional provisions at issue. In Takings, Epstein declares that his analysis "does not take into account the actual historical
intention of any of the parties who drafted or signed the document."''49
Likewise, in "Revitalization" he rejects any close examination of "the social and political context of the [Contract] clause ... [or] ... the histori-

(1989); The Classical Legal Tradition, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 292 (1988); Modem
Republicanism-Or The Flight From Substance, 97 Yale LJ. 1633 (1988); Luck, 6 Soc.
Phil. & Pol'y 17 (1988); The Mistakes of 1937, 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 5 (Winter 1988);
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987); Self-Interest and
the Constitution, 37J. Legal Educ. 153 (1987); Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 Soc. Phil. &
Pol'y 49 (Autumn 1986); Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221 (1979).
147. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on
Eminent Domain, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 253 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369 (1993);
Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 3 (1986);
148. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 703 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Revitalization].
149. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 26.
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cal accounts of the debates at the drafting and ratifying conventions."150
Epstein dodges these concerns mostly on theoretical grounds, positing

that not only the best, but indeed the only reliable evidence of original
understanding is the "plain meaning" of the Constitution's text in light of

the common linguistic usages of the day and of the document as a
whole.151 As a matter of interpretive theory, this stance is his prerogative.152 Whether to look into history at all is properly a matter of theory
and is not a matter that history itself can determine.153 Only once a historical assertion is made to support an interpretive claim do basic historical standards matter.

Those standards still matter here, however, because Epstein also relies on history to avoid history. The "historical particulars" surrounding

the Takings Clause, he asserts, are "likely to generate more confusion
than [they] eliminate[ ] ."154 Looking into the specific history of the
Contract Clause, he states more confidently, can "only distract us."1'55
Epstein, in other words, contends that the relevant historical sources may
(Takings) or do (Contracts) add more raw "data,"156 but fail to increase
understanding. That may well be the case, but Epstein gives few historical
reasons to believe it. His Takings discussion simply assumes historical
confusion; his treatment of Contracts seeks to prove "irreducible uncertainty" on the basis of a monograph and an article-each written before
1945-plus a student law review note.157 Not surprisingly, the substantive
150. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 706.
151. His main objection is the theoretical difficulty of discerning collective intent, a

point made explicit in his discussion of takings, but merely hinted at with regard to
contracts. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 27-28 ("Where the number of parties is
large and the divergence of views great, the best evidence of textual intention is the

language of the text itself."); Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 707 ("More reliable
is to treat the Constitution as a whole as the best evidence of that intention, and to try to

make sense of what the framers did, not of their motives for doing it.").
152. Epstein's theoretical disavowal of history on a relatively specific level, at least in

service of original intent, has curious parallels with the interpretative method advocated by
Ronald Dworkin. Both theorists reject as inherently problematic any attempt to discern

what Dworkin has famously termed the specific conceptions of given constitutional norms.
Both prefer, instead, reliance on constitutional text and structure to infer more what

Dworkin has again famously termed the concept of a constitutional norm. Both, finally,

are open to invoking the past to help derive a constitutional concept, though Epstein
commonly does so more aggressively than Dworkin. See Dworkin, supra note 121, at
34-56.

That said, one cannot resist the feeling that both Epstein and Dworkin eschew
undertaking "conceptional" history not only for their stated theoretical reasons, but
because they assume that history on this level simply will not support their larger projects.
153. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 96-104 (1993) (noting that
interpretative theories must be justified by substantive principles) [hereinafter Sunstein,
The Partial Constitution].

154. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 26.
155. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 706.
156. Id.

157. The sources cited are: Benjamin F. Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the
Constitution (1938); Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pts.
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discussion fares no better. Epstein frames the relevant debate as between
those arguing that the Framers viewed the Contract Clause as vaguely important, and those who contend that the Framers thought it to be inconsequential. There is no hint of how patriot constitutionalism, early state
experiments, or Federalist reactions do or do not illuminate the Founding conception of property and contract rights. This failure to justify
what is a fairly broad assertion could be dismissed as simply a perfunctory
attempt to bolster what is, in any event, mainly a theoretical point. In
truth, however, it is better seen as a dress rehearsal for Epstein's use of
history where he does seek to employ it affirmatively.
Epstein's main historical performance takes place on a stage far
more broad than the debates concerning particular clauses. Instead, he
makes clear that the relevant place on which to focus is the general background of the era, an area far too often neglected by legal scholars. In
Takings Epstein demonstrates his focus more than he proclaims it by devoting a chapter to examining how trends in English philosophy and law

provide the setting against which to consider the Constitution intelligently. In "Revitalization," he usefully makes his approach explicit at several points. He writes:

In order to overcome these historical weaknesses and interpreta-

tive gaps [on more specific questions], it seems not only proper,
but necessary, to look beyond the debates over the particular

clause, to more general and widely shared conceptions of government and contract, on the theory that they influenced the
basic constitutional structure.158

Put another way, concentrating on the general context yields benefits
that examination of more narrow topics does not. As he explains further,
"A focus on the eighteenth-century background puts us at one remove

from the document itself, but it has the compensating advantage of allowing us to look to a body of insights and shared understandings, many
of which are on the public record."1159 For Epstein, one example of the
kind of general topic that might be usefully explored is the Founders'
attitude toward factions. On this point he notes that "[the framers]
sought to control those abuses [of faction] by adopting a scheme of limited government."6 It is this type of general historical point that can

yield valid constitutional insight. As Epstein argues the point, "If this
sketch [about the abuses of faction] captures something of the general
mood of the time, then it seems quite impossible to infer that the framers

1-3), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944), and Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the
Contract Clause, 89 Yale LJ. 1623 (1980). Of these, only Wright devotes any sustained
attention to the framing of the Contract Clause, and then only at the outset of his work.
See Wright, supra, at 3-26.

158. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 754.
159. Id. at 711.
160. Id. at 715.
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intended judicial deference to the legislature on all economic

matters."161
In each work the general background, as Epstein perceives it, is
plain, and oriented toward rights: property rights above all. In Takings
he declares that the "Lockean system,"-by which he means a commitment to just compensation for the taking of property for any public use
other than to provide for external defense and internal order-"was

dominant at the time when the Constitution was adopted."1'62 Concerning the Contract Clause, the shared understandings are scarcely less
plain: the Framers designed the government as they did out of a general
fear that the governmental decisionmaking processes fall easy prey to factions which "can use the mantle of government power to deprive persons

of their liberty and property," particularly property broadly defined.163
Against this historical backdrop, the Constitution's basic features

come into proper focus as ways to safeguard the basic Lockean conception of rights that Epstein proffers. In Takings the many familiar structural devices in the Constitution-including separation of powers, the
complex provisions on selecting public officials, the principle of limited
enumerated powers-were expected to serve the substantive end of pro-

tecting the "private property, of 'lives, liberties, and estates' that Locke
considered the purpose of government."l64 Epstein's study of the Contract Clause likewise casts these structures as mechanisms for securing

rights, particularly the rights of property broadly understood.'65 In eac
work the specific protections of rights-including the Takings Clause and
the Contract Clause-bolster these devices by identifying expressly and in
a judicially enforceable manner the ends of government that the Constitution's distinctive framework is designed to protect.166
Such is the broad background case that Epstein considers important
enough to put forward. He does not, however, put it forward convinc-

ingly. The problems again begin with his methods. To his credit, he gets
no basic fact wrong,167 in large part because his interpretative approach
161. Id.

162. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16.

163. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 711.

164. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 17.
165. See Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 711-16. The differences that exist

between this account and that of Takings center on two points. First, "Revitalization" does
not rely on Locke as the source of the Founders' commitment to property rights, though
that commitment is fully consistent with Epstein's interpretation of Locke in Takings.

Second, "Revitalization" emphasizes that, as an intermediate step, the Constitution's
structural devices served property rights by helping to control self-interested factions. Id.

166. See Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 716; Epstein, Takings, supra note
9, at 18.

167. There are two arguable exceptions. One arises in Takings when Epstein states
that he will consider the Takings Clause to apply against the states. In part he justifies this

move because it "is consistent with the basic Lockean design, as is reflected by the inclusion
of some version of the eminent domain [i.e. Takings] clause in all state constitutions."

Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 18. This justification, in other words, relies on the
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argument that the states currently reflect the "Lockean design" of the Federal

Constitution. The words "inclusion" and "the" eminent domain clauses aside, the
highlighted passage in context implies that the states always had such clauses. If the
Lockean design was "dominant" in the eighteenth century, it would be surprising if any of

the original states did not have one. The problem for Epstein is that only two states in

1787 had takings clauses (along with Congress in the Northwest Ordinance). See infra text
accompanying note 192. Thus, to the extent Epstein means only to discuss current state

constitutions, his articulation is unclear. To the extent he seeks to imply that the original
states were "Lockean" in this sense, he is incorrect.

Epstein's other arguable error-which admittedly falls well outside the history of the
Founding-arises in his other justification for applying the Takings Clause to the states.
Here the justification is that: "Limitations against the powers of the states have been

answered in practice by incorporating specific protections against the states, including the
eminent domain clause" in Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1896). Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 18. But this is neither the only nor the best
reading of the case. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court does not rest on the argument
that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the Court characterizes the right not to be
deprived of property for public use without just compensation as inhering in the concept
of due process. The Court comes to this conclusion not by relying on the Takings Clause
but instead by discussing principles of republican institutions, the common law, natural
equity, universal law as well as case law, and treatises relying on these sources. Chicago 166
U.S. at 235-41. Epstein may mean that Chicago indirectly or in effect incorporated the
eminent domain clause against the states, but that is not what he says.

168. To quote the affirmative proposition: "The Lockean system was dominant at the
time when the Constitution was adopted. His theory of state was adopted in Blackstone's
Commentaries, and the protection of property against its enemies was a central and
recurrent feature of the political thought of the day." Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16.
169. This conception is problematic since, as Epstein admits, Locke himself rested the
legitimacy of government on a doctrine of implied consent rather than on doctrines of
restitution and just compensation. See id. at 14-16.
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Commentaries' reliance on Locke,170 the work's position on takings,171 and
its influence on American constitutionalism172 are all complex matters
that fall far short of affording Epstein the simple support he seeks.
As a measure of just how complex this situation is, consider the matter of Blackstone's own position on property. Blackstone does state that

"the law permits no man, or set of men, to [take private property for
public use] without the consent of the owner of the land ... [or without]
giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby
sustained."''73 But, while supporting a right to just compensation, the
passage fails to resolve a number of ancillary issues. For one, it is unclear
whether Blackstone is talking about a right that is judicially enforceable
or merely aspirational. It is likewise unclear whether the passage aims to
limit local authorities alone, or Parliament as well. No less important, the

Commentaries elsewhere take positions that manifestly run counter to at
least Epstein's version of Locke. First, Blackstone frequently recognizes

the legitimacy of regulation that diminishes the value of property.174
Forrest McDonald amplifies this point in a concise yet exhaustively
researched treatment of English and American property law generally.

He concludes that "the crucial fact is that ownership did not include the
absolute right to buy or sell one's property in a free market; that was not a
part of the scheme of things in eighteenth-century England and

America."''75 Second, the Commentaries famously declare that Par
is sovereign, which among other things precludes the judicial enforcement of any fundamental right against an act of that national legislature.

On this last point, moreover, Blackstone specifically rejects Locke's position that "the people" retain a power to remove or alter the legislature
under the British Constitution.176

170. Edward S. Corwin, for example, viewed Blackstone as ultimately a disciple not of
Locke but of Hobbes. See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American

Constitutional Law 85-87 (1965). The point is not that Corwin is correct (though his use
of sources is comparatively far more rigorous). Rather, the point is that Epstein fails to see
that the relationship between Blackstone and Locke is a far more complicated matter than
his conclusory assertions allow. See also Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's

Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 205, 264-72 (1979) (explaining the ways in which
Blackstone was not a Lockean liberal).

171. For nuanced discussions of Blackstone on property, see DanielJ. Boorstin, The
Mysterious Science of the Law 167-87 (1958); Kennedy, supra note 170, at 313-50.

172. See Bailyn, supra note 57, at 171-75; Boorstin, supra note 171, at 3-4; Stanley N.
Katz, Introduction to 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at
xi-xii (1979 facsimile ed.); Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 265.
173. 1 Blackstone, supra note 172, at *135.

174. See, e.g., 4 id. at *154-60 (discussing laws prohibiting "offenses against public

trade"); 4 id. at *170 (discussing sumptuary laws); 1 id. at *187-98, 334 (discussing
reservation of public property and resources). For that matter, so too, arguably, does

Locke. See John Locke, Second Treatise, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
? 139, at 188 (1965 ed.).

175. McDonald, supra note 67, at 14.

176. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 172, at *156-58.
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Beyond Blackstone, Epstein also attempts to bolster his assertion
about Lockean dominance with the contention that "the protection of
private property against its enemies was a central and recurrent feature of

the political thought of the day."'77 For this proposition he relies on
Charles Beard's 1912 The Supreme Court and the Constitution178 together
with a book review and a manuscript byJennifer Nedelsky.179 Leave aside
the problem that, then or now, not all defenses of property were necessar-

ily "Lockean." More troubling, in terms of sources, is Epstein's reliance
on a dated work by a historian whose main thesis has since been eclipsed

by generations of subsequent work'80-a problem mitigated but not
eliminated by citation to Nedelsky.'8' The general problem, in short, remains: Epstein provides support for his major historical claim about
Locke in almost inverse proportion to the boldness of the claim he
asserts.

Matters improve in Epstein's discussion of the Contract Clause, but
not sufficiently for his assertions to be persuasive on their own terms.

Here Epstein spends more time developing an argument consistent with
his general claim that a Lockean view of property dominated contempo-

raneous thinking.'82 What also drove the Founders to embrace the strategies of limited government and enumerated rights, he contends, was a
specific fear of self-interested factions controlling the legislatures.'83 For
support, Epstein first trots out three of James Madison's oft-cited essays
from The Federalist: Nos. 10, 44, and 51.184 This is on the right track, just
not far enough down it. In a marked improvement upon his cryptic use
of Blackstone's Commentaries, Epstein does make specific reference to
passages that support his general proposition. What he also does, however, is to assume that simply citing James Madison, without more, suffices as a basis for making grand points about the Founding. In this
Epstein is hardly alone among legal scholars, yet such a basis would leave
him a solitary figure among competent history students-which is pre177. Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16.

178. See Charles A. Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution (1912); Epstein,
Takings, supra note 9, at 16 n.24.

179. See Epstein, Takings, supra note 9, at 16. Later editions add a cite to a Nedelsky
book review. See id. (1993 ed.).

180. For Beard's work and the works that have superseded it, see supra text
accompanying notes 35, 50-114.

181. Since Epstein first cited her, Nedelsky has established herself as an important
scholar of property rights during the Founding era. See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Private
Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and
its Legacy (1990).

182. In "Revitalization," Epstein refers to the Founders as "men schooled in Hobbes
and Locke," for the proposition that they knew government had to exist to constrain the
use of private force. He does not, however, rely on Locke's overall influence with regard to
the Founders' solutions as much as he does in Takings. See Epstein, Revitalization, supra
note 148, at 711.
183. See id. at 711-16.

184. See id. at 711, 712 n.27, 714.
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cisely the point. In fairness, Epstein also supports his claim with a reference to self-interested state legislation enacted at the time of the Federal

Convention.185 Substantively this is a plausible point, especially in light
of the historical work done in the last twenty-five years.186 Methodologically, however, the trouble is that Epstein refers to none of this work in
making the point, preferring instead to rely on two pages from a mono-

graph that is nearly fifty years old.'87 Once more, a point about the past
that is important enough to urge is not necessarily important enough to
urge persuasively.
As procedure goes, so does substance. It is, moreover, exactly on the
level of "general mood" where Epstein's historical assertions run into
scholarly trouble. In his writings on both takings and contracts,
Epstein-while nowhere relying on Hartz per se-nonetheless writes as if

scholarship ceased with The Liberal Tradition in America. But Hartz was
only the beginning of the contemporary encounter with early American
ideas. If the past two generations of historical work have settled on any
point, it is that Lockean political philosophy was not "dominant" in the
eighteenth century, and certainly not in the straightforward way that
Epstein sketches. Interestingly, this colossal historiographical fact hurts
Epstein's overall project in ways he ignores, yet could nonetheless help it
in ways he fails to seize.

The potential harm, which is potentially insurmountable, arises from
the evident patriot commitment to common-law rights and republican
representation apart from Lockean liberties. Start with rights. John
Phillip Reid's massive body of scholarship, in particular, challenges the
claim that Lockean notions of natural property rights, still less Epstein's

version of Locke, significantly fueled early American defenses of property. Reid and others suggest rather that American Whigs, then patriots,
and later republicans drew not on Locke but on positive English law. On
Reid's account, English law, including English property rights, in turn
derived from doctrines of custom, ancient "original" contracts between

the rulers and the ruled, and contemporaneous representation.8 As
will be seen, only the last of these sources made either the law, or still less
legal rights, a direct function of "deliberative democracy." What should
be seen here, however, is that these sources did serve as bases for legitimacy in themselves, reflecting the general "consent of the governed."'189
To the extent they did so, the law that resulted could not provide ajudicially enforceable remedy for an uncompensated taking by a representa185. See id. at 712.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 98-114.
187. The citation, again, is to Wright, supra note 157. This criticism should not be
taken to mean that Wright's work is inapposite or obsolete. To the contrary, it remains

perhaps the leading work on that subject. The point is, rather, that Epstein neglects
subsequent research and analysis; this failure precludes him from placing Wright's insights
in modern scholarly context.

188. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92; see generally 1 Reid, supra note 89.
189. See infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
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tive legislature, because the act of such a legislature reflected-and, if
anything, reflected more directly-the same consent of the governed on
which the right itself was based. Blackstone notwithstanding, English law
does not seem to have afforded such a right even in a hortatory sense.
The problems multiply with the question of republican representa-

tion. Here modern scholarship is far more extensive than it is on English
rights, in many ways forming the core of recent work on American constitutionalism. And here Epstein's Lockean paradigm runs directly counter
to the constitutional strategies that this body of scholarship identifies as
preeminent in the years following Independence. Chief among these
strategies was a deepening commitment to representative legitimacy that
was far more thoroughgoing than anything realistically mooted across the
Atlantic.190 With regard to property, this republican commitment

pointed toward-not away from-robust exercises of legislative power.
American constitutional thought during the Critical Period to a great extent viewed representative legislatures, which consequently reflected the
will of a virtuous populace, as sovereign. Legislative sovereignty won
champions both as an end in itself, insofar as it realized the value of selfgovernment, and as the best means of ensuring liberty, including prop-

erty and contract rights.'9' It followed that property and contract protections against republican legislatures had to be given a narrow scope, if
indeed any scope at all, because such protections made no sense by definition. The people, through their assemblies, simply could not tyrannize
themselves.

190. To the contrary, those who argued for Parliamentary reform in either Britain or
Ireland had a peculiar combination of notoriety and impotence. For British reformers, see

George Rude, Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774 (1962). For their Irish
counterparts, see Francis G. James, Ireland in the Empire, 1688-1770, at 182-85 (1973).
See generally Robbins, supra note 56.

191. Nedelsky ably summarizes the views of the late HerbertJ. Storing, probably the

greatest expert on the Constitution's opponents, as holding that the Antifederalists viewed
republican self-government not as an end in itself, but as a means to protect rights
independent of democratic process:

Storing cautions against a misunderstanding of the Anti-Federalists' treatment of
civic virtue and the common good: for him, these values were important to the
Anti-Federalists, but the values were merely instrumental to individual liberty. He
concludes that the Anti-Federalists were liberals "in the decisive sense that they
saw the end of government as the security of individual liberty, not the promotion
of virtue or the fostering of some organic common good." Storing thus shares
the Federalist view that the two groups' differences over the nature of the citizen's
role in public affairs were essentially disagreements about the best means for
protecting rights under limited government.

Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining Democratic Politics: Antifederalists, Federalists, and the
Constitution, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 340, 344-45 (1982) (reviewing Herbert J. Storing, The
Complete Anti-Federalist (1981) (citations omitted)). Nedelsky is quick to add that
Storing undervalues, indeed overlooks, the "high value" that the Antifederalists placed on
"the citizen's active participation in the affairs of state." Id. at 145. She does not, however,
dispute the view that the Antifederalists adhered to classical republican tenets as a way to
protect rights as well.
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As if all this were not bad enough, not only were these republican
commitments nearly antithetical to Epstein's vision of Locke, but they

flourished on Epstein's own chosen terms of "general mood" as much a
in the context of specific debates and applications. For that matter, the

same point holds for constitutional text, the area Epstein considers even
more probative in actually applying the Constitution than general background history. Of the available constitutional texts, only two state constitutions (plus the Northwest Ordinance) included any protection against

legislative takings,'92 and none included any protection of contracts,'93
by the time the Federal Convention convened. Nor do the problems end
here. Probably most Antifederalists, and even a number of their
Federalist counterparts, carried these republican commitments past

1787.194 These commitments are still reflected in that part of the constitutional text which to a significant extent owes its existence to Antifeder-

alist agitation, the Bill of Rights.195
Yet if recent scholarship takes away, it also offers in return. The cornerstone of recent work on the Founding, itself building on Revolutionary scholarship, remains Gordon Wood's insight that the Federalists in
fundamental ways rejected the republican assumptions especially evident

in the first state constitutions.'96 This is not to say that the rejection w
total or final. Nor is it to say that the Federalist rejection of legislative

sovereignty in particular meant a turn, or return, to Lockean conceptions

of property and contract rights.197 An account faithful to the sources,
which scholars such as William Michael Treanor are trying to construct,

probably points somewhere between these extremes.'98 Yet the point remains that however extensive the Federalist reaction to the republican

excesses of the Critical Period, any reaction to legislative control of property and contract cuts Epstein's way. Epstein, moreover, seems dimly
aware that his case benefits in just this fashion with his passing reference,
albeit vaguely made and poorly supported, to "much of the state legisla-

192. See Vt. Const. art. II; Mass. Const. art. X; Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787,
art. II, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1961). Vermont, moreover, was not truly a state insofar as it was not

admitted into the Union until 1791. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and
Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale
LJ. 694, 702 n.38 (1985).
193. See generally 2 The Roots of the Bill of Rights 231-382 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1980).

194. Moreover, the procedural safeguards Epstein attributes to the Framers for many
Federalist advocates cut against substantive judicial protection. See Wood, Creation, supra
note 14, at 536-42. For an argument that this view persisted through the drafting and
ratification of the Bill of Rights, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100

Yale LJ. 1131 (1991).
195. See generally Morris, supra note 104, at 298-320; HerbertJ. Storing, What the
Anti-federalists Were For 64-70 (1981).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 108-112.

197. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
198. See Treanor, supra note 192, at 702 n.38.
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tion passed about the time of the Constitutional Convention"199 as one
reason for the drafting of an explicit clause protecting the obligation of
contracts. The last generation's reassessments of early American constitutionalism offer Epstein the opportunity to advance this position far more
credibly than he does, though perhaps far less completely than he might
wish. As with historical propositions uncongenial to his agenda, however,
this is one offer that in these two works Epstein seems indifferent about
accepting.
C. Behind the Republican Revival

From here, appeals to history could only become more convincing,
especially if they took on board any cargo at all from recent historical
scholarship. A number of theorists have exploited this opportunity under
the banner of "modern" or "neo-republicanism."200 Of these, perhaps
the most influential and evidently the most prolific, though not necessar-

ily the most historically minded,201 has been Cass Sunstein, much of
whose early work202 recently culminated in his landmark The Partial
Constitution.203 As a leading "neo-republican," Sunstein seeks to shift constitutional reform away from the courts "to administrative and legislative
bodies, and to democratic arenas generally."204 In part, this move reflects
a disillusionment with the Warren Court's perceived inability to translate

high ideals into broadly supported social commitments;205 in part it re199. Epstein, Revitalization, supra note 148, at 712.
200. See supra note 20.

201. That title-and nearly the title of most prolific-would have to go to Akhil Reed
Amar. Some of Amar's principal works include the following: The Consent of the

Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994)
[hereinafter Amar, Consent]; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale
LJ. 1193 (1992); The Bill of Rights, supra note 194; The Two-Tiered Structure of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499 (1990); Philadelphia Revisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988); Our Forgotten
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 Yale LJ. 281 (1987); Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425 (1987).
202. A by no means exhaustive list of Sunstein's works includes the following: Free
Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1992); Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1992);
Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy]; Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984).
203. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153.

204. Id. at 9-10. In this Sunstein echoes the call made a century earlier by James
Bradley Thayer, who attempted to limit the scope ofjudicial review and thus increase the

arena for progressive democratic reform. SeeJames B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 155-56 (1893); cf.
James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 240
(1993) (observing that "Sunstein has made his own plea to be the Thayer for the next
generation").

205. The now classic work in this regard is Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991); see also Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts
and Social Policy (1977).
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sponds to dispiriting interest-group pluralistic accounts of political behavior put forward by Sunstein's law and economics colleagues at the

University of Chicago and elsewhere;206 and in part it stems from the preClinton expectation that an anti-progressive ethos would dominate the
Supreme Court into the next century.207
Whatever its origins, Sunstein's modern republican agenda fits well

with certain themes coming out of early American constitutionalism. But
this partial fit came with a built-in temptation to be partial, that is, to
invoke only those themes that provide support. Rather than look to
England, Locke, and rights, Sunstein looks mainly to the Continent, im-

plicitly to Machiavelli, and self-confidently to the classical republican tenets of self-government. Procedurally, the results represent a substantial
improvement over Epstein, but are nonetheless flawed in important ways.

Substantively, Sunstein's use of history is likewise more sophisticated yet
one-sided.

Sunstein refuses to be ruled by history, but he does like to have it on

his side. He is no originalist. Using Bork's The Tempting of America as the
stand-in,208 he has rejected the view that the intentions of the Framers

should dictate constitutional interpretation. But Sunstein may accurately
be called a historicist.209 As such, he has argued that the "future of American public law depends in significant part on the way that its tradition is

understood."'210 His own work, especially the work that led up to The
Partial Constitution, commonly includes more than a perfunctory appeal
to the views of the Founders. To take one example, Sunstein's important

206. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent:
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to

Democratic Theory (1956); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 276-78,
354-55, 359-60 (1990); Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 167
(1988).

207. See Cass R. Sunstein, WhatJudge Bork Should Have Said, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 205
(1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Judge Bork].
208. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 96-110; see also
Sunstein, Judge Bork, supra note 207. This strategy is not without its problems, largely
because it gives Sunstein too easy a target. Sunstein rightly points out that Bork cannot
justify reliance on original intent by relying on original intent without falling prey to

obvious circularity. He also correctly notes that Bork's attempts to justify originalism with
reference to democratic theory are thin and conclusory. Having dispensed with Bork,

Sunstein nonetheless fails to consider whether more sophisticated defenses of originalism
must likewise fail. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 226
(1988).

209. For present purposes, a historicist may be defined as one who thinks history is
important. See Nelson, supra note 124, at 459 n.57.

210. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539, 1563 (1988)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival]. Along these lines Sunstein
specifically asserts that "the importance of Madison for current constitutional controversy

does not depend solely on the quality of Madison's thought" but also on his role as a major
figure in American constitutional tradition. Id.
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most thorough historical invocations, contains numerous passages attempting to relate "modern historical scholarship ... of the role of republican thought in the period before, during, and after the ratification
of the American Constitution" to his own "particular version of republican thought, one that avoids some of the difficulties associated with competing conceptions of public life, both republican and antirepubli-

can."9212 Nor is The Partial Constitution itself any exception. The bod
the work commences with a brief but prominent consideration of what
"the framers of the American Constitution sought to create," by "set[ting]
out certain ideas that [played] a prominent role in the founding pe-

riod."9213 For these reasons, the following examination will focus on th
two works.

In each, Sunstein prefaces his accounts of the Founding with declara-

tions of balance over partiality.214 In stark contrast to Epstein, he proclaims that " [t] here can be little doubt that elements of both pluralist and
republican thought played a role during the period of the constitutional

framing."9215 In fact, Sunstein continues, "[t] he opposition between liberal and republican thought in the context of the framing is ... largely a

false one."9216 Multifaceted thought, moreover, translated into a multifaceted framework. "What emerged is in several respects a hybrid,"
composed of a number of competing elements "in the theory of politics
embodied in the American Constitution."9217

Sunstein makes the character of this hybrid especially clear when he
recounts the Founders' understanding of society. On his view, many of
the Founders moved beyond the classical republican position that civic

virtue could be the primary basis for representative government. Citing
John Adams, Noah Webster, and Patrick Henry, Sunstein notes that
Adams in particular was "quite skeptical about the idea that anything

other than self-interest could be the basis for political behavior."218 In
Madison and Hamilton he observes a certain "skepticism about important

elements of classical republican thought."9219 But if the Founders were no
longer classical republicans, Sunstein continues, neither were they "lib211. See id.

212. Id. at 1540-41; see also id. at 1548-51, 1558-64, 1566-67.
213. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18.

214. The emphasis on historical balance and complexity described in this paragraph
appears mainly in "Beyond the Republican Revival"; it all but disappears by the time of The
Partial Constitution.

215. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1558.

216. Id. at 1567. As the previous two passages make clear, Sunstein sometimes uses
"liberalism" and interest-group "pluralism" interchangeably, especially when speaking of
the Founding. Nonetheless, he clearly rejects the notion that "liberalism" necessarily, or

even primarily, entails interest group pluralism. See id. at 1541, 1566-71.
217. Id. at 1561.
218. Id. at 1558 (footnote omitted).
219. Id.
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eral" interest-group pluralists. They did not abandon certain traditional
republican beliefs, in particular the "belief in deliberative government

and the need for civic virtue."220 Instead "[t]hey attempted to carry forward the classical republican belief in virtue-a word that appears
throughout the period-but to do so in a way that responded realistically,

not romantically, to likely difficulties in the real world of political life."'22'
In consequence, Sunstein asserts, "the framers' conception of human nature synthesized elements of classical republicanism with its emerging interest-group competitor."222
The hybrid nature of the account begins to fade, however, when Sun-

stein shifts from the Founders' translation of their descriptions of society
into prescriptions for government. For Sunstein, the Founders' intellectual inheritance above all led them to seek "a republic of reasons."223 In

this they responded to three related evils: monarchy, corruption, and faction. With the Revolution, Americans rejected the "monarchical legacy"
of England, which Sunstein defines as the traditional belief in a natural

order in society.224 The Founders likewise repudiated self-interested re
resentation by government officials, whether "corruption" in the modern

sense of bribery or "corruption" in the eighteenth-century meaning of

officials aggrandizing their own powers at the expense of the people as a

whole.225 Yet most importantly, in Sunstein's estimation, the Founders
attempted to create a system that would limit the power of self-interested
private groups or factions because "on their view, even an insistent majority should not have its way, if power was the only thing to be invoked on
its behalf."226 This last lesson in particular arose out of the unhappy
reign of factions in the states during the Critical Period. A republic of
reasons, otherwise known as a "deliberative democracy," would combat
these evils by ruling out of bounds the justification of any government
action with reference to private interest or to nature, as opposed to the
common good. In this way, deliberative democracy reflected an ongoing
commitment to the idea of civic virtue that was central to classical republicanism. On this account, for the Founders, "[t]he basic institutions of
the resulting Constitution were intended to encourage and to profit from
deliberation."227 Thus, what Epstein views as mechanisms to serve Lockean rights,228 Sunstein sees as means to promote a "Republic of Rea-

220. Id. at 1558-59.

221. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21.
222. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1561.

223. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 17.
224. See id. at 19.

225. See id. Sunstein, in distinguishing between "[a]ctual corruption" and general
self-aggrandizement, apparently is unaware of the broader eighteenth-century meaning of

"corruption." For discussions of "corruption" in the broader sense, see Lewis Namier,
England in the Age of the American Revolution (2d ed. 1961); Bailyn, supra note 57.
226. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 19.

227. Id. at 23.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 162-166.
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sons."229 Checks and balances, bicameralism, presentment and the Presidential veto, federalism, the election of Senators by the state legislatures,
the selection of the President by the Electoral College-all of these familiar mechanisms came into being primarily, if not exclusively, to insure
that no government action could occur without the thorough airing of
different perspectives aimed at advancing the common good.230 Judicial
review, too, would safeguard deliberation by protecting the considered

judgments of the people, embodied in constitutional law, against the
transitory, ill-considered actions of public officials. Even the Founding
concern for many, if not most, rights arose from the commitment to deliberation. "What is distinctive about the republican view is that it understands most rights"-Sunstein typically mentions freedom of speech, the
right to vote, and trial by jury-"as either the preconditions for or the

outcome of an undistorted deliberative process."'231 By each of these
means the Founders sought "to promote deliberation and to limit the risk

that public officials would be mouthpieces for constituent interests."232
These same points apply to Founding strategies that Sunstein concedes at least at first blush look like repudiations of classical republican
commitments. The Federalists thus turned on its head the notion that

civic virtue sufficient for public-spirited deliberation could flourish only
in small republics, by arguing that in large republics, factions would can-

cel one another out.233 Sunstein notes that the Federalists likewise rejected the traditional commitment to homogeneous republics by contending that the clash of perspectives in a heterogeneous land would
promote deliberation.234 By these means, Sunstein concludes, the Founders not only maintained their commitment to deliberation, but also
"modernized the classical republican belief in civic virtue."235

In procedural terms, Sunstein makes his case more persuasively than
Epstein in almost every way. As with Epstein, simple factual accuracy is
largely beside the point, since Sunstein also makes few specific factual
assertions. By contrast, Sunstein seizes the opportunity that the rediscovery of early American constitutionalism presents. Not surprisinglythough frustratingly-this is more evident in the articles that led to The
Partial Constitution than in the book itself, but it is sufficiently prominent

229. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 17, 24.
230. See id. at 23.

231. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1551. Sunstei

later, and somewhat ambiguously, notes that "[m]any of the original constitutional rig
provide spheres of private autonomy to be insulated from government interference;
some of [these rights] are more easily understood as an outgrowth of Lockean ideas," ev
though "such rights can be [and were?] justified in republican fashion." Id. at 1562.

232. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21-22.
233. See id. at 20-21.
234. See id. at 24.
235. See id. at 20.
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in both.236 Consider first the use of primary sources. In neither the book

nor the articles does Sunstein lean solely on the totemic Federalist.
Rather, he relies extensively on letters, papers, and pamphlets written not

just by the Madisons and Hamiltons,237 but by less familiar yet important
figures such as John Witherspoon and Benjamin Rush.238 In so doing,
Sunstein makes use of recent primary source collections that are themselves a result of current scholarly interest.239 His case is even more impressive with reference to secondary works. Present and accounted for

are Hartz, Wood, Bailyn, Pocock, and Appleby, along with numerous
other important historians.240 It is, moreover, a tonic to see the William
and Mary Quarterly, perhaps the leading professional journal of early
American history and culture, cited in a law review piece discussing early
American constitutionalism.24'
Sunstein's command of sources in turn promises a special sensitivity

to context. In both his articles and his book Sunstein acknowledges that
there is a far bigger picture than any of his brief historical treatments can
adequately paint. He ostensibly addresses this problem first by sketching
in those parts of the canvas relevant to his main account. As noted,
Sunstein glances back toward the Revolution to note that the Founders'

republican solutions in important ways moved beyond certain traditional
republican strategies, such as the commitment to small polities. In similar fashion, Sunstein offers a glimpse past the Founding to show how

Madison's brand of republicanism partially anticipated, but more importantly differed from, the interest-group pluralism that many historians ar-

gue later took root in American society.242 More generally, Sunstein further deals with the problem of context by sounding general caveats. The
Partial Constitution, in particular, laudably warns that "[i]n light of the
sheer diversity of influential ideas, any description of the framing com236. The transition from law review article to legal monograph commonly entails
streamlining" the footnotes by deleting citations. This practice is frustrating with regard
to legal works discussing history insofar as historical persuasiveness in particular turns on
how thoroughly the evidence is presented. It is doubly problematic for theorists like
Ackerman, who are more heavily reliant on history than either Epstein or Sunstein. See
infra text accompanying notes 285-290.

237. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 19-21; Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1558-63.

238. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 22-24; Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1540 n.1, 1566 n.151.
239. For example, Sunstein relies on Herbert J. Storing's important multivolume
collection, The Complete Antifederalist. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
supra note 210, at 1556 n.91. For a discussion of developments in primary source
materials, see Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1569-78.

240. Others include Lance Banning, Martin Diamond, Jackson Turner Main, and
Thomas Pangle. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 359 n.8;

Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1540 n.3, 1558 n.108, 1566
n.153.

241. See, e.g., Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1540 n.3.
242. See id. at 1558-64.
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ments and emphasize others."243

The promise of concern for context, however, is not the same thing
as concern itself, and it is here that the problems with Sunstein's am
proach begin. For all his talk of the bigger picture, Sunstein actually addresses few aspects of it. Troubling enough is the "glancing" manner in
which Sunstein approaches what is his main topic, republicanism. His
brief treatments of classical republicanism, to say nothing of its role in
the Revolution and flowering during the Critical Period, do little to situate the subsequent "Madisonian" republicanism he describes. Why the
Antifederalists clung to the "traditional" republican model, why the
Federalists transformed it, and what the overall differences were between
the two remain unclear. Even more sketchy is Sunstein's description of
the origins and nature of republicanism's main "competitor": liberal, interest-group pluralism, which, however uncongenial to many of his theoretical commitments, he acknowledges to have formed an important
component of Federalist thought.244

But more troubling is what he does not address. Showing laudable

candor, Sunstein acknowledges that his historical account simply will not
deal with contemporaneous beliefs in ideas such as "aristocratic rule ...
agrarian populism .. . interest-group warfare . .. radical centralization of

politics in the national government . . . racial and sexual hierarchy . . .
Calvinism ... [and] natural rights," to name a few.245 Giving an adequate
sense of the Founders' constitutional world may be possible without reference to a number of these concepts.246 But it is not possible without
those that are central to that world. Of those he mentions, the Founding
commitment to natural rights247-and more generally, rights conceived
as distinct from or even in tension with deliberative democracy-would
243. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18.
244. See Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1561; Sunstein,
Interest Groups, supra note 20, at 39.

245. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18; see also Sunstein,

Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1539-40 (noting difficulties of "modern
efforts to revive principles of classical republicanism").

246. For example, Calvinism arguably played at best a muted role in constitutional
deliberations in the late eighteenth century, especially among Enlightenment theists like

Jefferson. See Bailyn, supra note 63, at 32-33. But see Morgan, supra note 80, at 34-43
(suggesting that the legacy of Puritanism was important to American Revolutionary
thought).

247. Sunstein is well-known for his attack on the idea of natural or "pre-political"
rights as a matter of theory. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 4-7,
40-92; Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 202, at 885. By contrast, his discussion of
natural rights as a matter of history is all but non-existent. The most he has to say in either

The Partial Constitution or "Beyond the Republican Revival" is: "Many of the original
constitutional rights provide spheres of private autonomy to be insulated from government

interference; such rights can be justified in republican fashion, but some of them are mor
easily understood as an outgrowth of Lockean ideas. Other rights can be read as

straightforwardly republican in inspiration." Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
supra note 210, at 1562.
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make any shortlist of essentials. Caveats, however laudable, simply cannot
salvage a historical account so highly selective that it omits critical pieces
of the structure it needs to rebuild.
Nor is the prerogative of deciding what counts as critical Sunstein's;
rather, it is the decision of those whose legacy he has undertaken to describe. Try though he might, Sunstein does not, and perhaps cannot,
succeed in limiting his description to "certain ideas that did play a prominent role in the founding period and that are especially well suited to

those of us now in search of a usable past."248 This strategy might have
worked had Sunstein invoked the Founders solely as one might cite
Antonio Gramsci or Michel Foucault, that is, on the strength of the usefulness of ideas put forward by thinkers who otherwise have no direct

connection to our constitutional culture. But Sunstein invokes the Foun-

ders for something more, namely the authority that springs from their
historical connection with a document and the culture it continues to
shape.249 Given this historicist commitment, even the most explicit disclaimers almost inevitably fail. As an initial matter, it seems doubtful that
most readers would expect that a historical sketch about the Founding
would omit ideas that the Founders themselves thought were part of their
core understanding of the Constitution (or, for that matter, that were
directly relevant to contemporary theories challenging the author's
own).250 More tellingly, Sunstein's account belies his caveats in any case.
To claim, for example, that the Constitution was designed to establish a

republic of reasons "[a]bove all,"25' confirms the expectation that any
themes the Founders thought basic to their achievement not only have
been considered but would have been considered expressly.252 In these
circumstances, neither Sunstein nor any other theorist can freely pick
and choose what ideas to recount merely on the grounds of usefulness.
To do so necessarily runs the risk of mischaracterization. Consider a

potential modern example. A student decides that an account of modern
constitutional theorists will help the project she has undertaken not only
because they furnish certain ideas she finds useful, but also because their
prominence adds authority to the project. Despite caveats that she will be
necessarily selective in her treatment of individual works, she makes clear
that her account will be descriptive and effectively gives rise to the expectation that she will not omit ideas that are central to a particular thinker.
She then characterizes The Partial Constitution's theory of deliberative democracy almost exclusively in terms of its commitment to government
248. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 18.
249. See supra text accompanying note 213.

250. Sunstein mentions Epstein's rights-based theory in exactly this regard. See
Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21, 359 n.9.
251. Id. at 19-20.

252. Likewise, repeatedly referring to what "the framers" collectively thought, sought,
and established also tends to confirm this expectation. See id. at 18-24; see also Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1558-64 (discussing the Framers'
conception of representation and its relation to elements of republican thought).

This content downloaded from 150.108.60.10 on Wed, 20 Dec 2017 23:36:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

1995]

HISTORY

"LITE"

575

regulation, calling it "mainly a framework of regulatory reinvigoration."
The student's account, however, all but omits Sunstein's central concern
for an array of rights as preconditions for deliberative self-government.253
When Sunstein fails to include at least those concepts the Founders made

clear were integral to constitutional understanding-at a minimum "nondeliberative" rights-he inadvertently does to that understanding what
the student has inadvertently done to his theory.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Sunstein's methods yield substance that is
in many respects balanced, yet in others-often the more important
ones-is one-sided. The balance in Sunstein's account emerges most notably where he demonstrates the hybrid nature of the Founding most
convincingly-his treatment of the Founders' understandings of human

nature and society.254 By arguing that the Founders retained the belief
that virtue could still form a basis for government, Sunstein clearly acknowledges the continuing legacy of the classical republicanism recon-

structed above all by Pocock.255 Yet, by acknowledging that the Founders
had also become skeptical of that legacy, Sunstein not only refuses to
abandon the "touch of rightness" in earlier liberal accounts but also effectively picks up Gordon Wood's insight that the Critical Period hastened
this skepticism.256 Particularly convincing in this regard is Sunstein's reli-

ance on The Radicalism of the American Revolution,257 in which Wood moves
beyond Creation's preoccupation with government to focus on early
American understandings of society.258
Government, however, remains the focus of constitutional history
and theory alike, and it is here that Sunstein's problems begin. Unlike
the Founders themselves, he does not translate this more synthetic view
of human behavior to the problem of setting up institutions that would
balance power and liberty. Viewed against the sweep of early American
constitutional scholarship, the description he advances gives short shrift

to those "non-republican" ideas that the Founders themselves viewed as
central to American constitutional development, but which had little to
do with the deliberative democracy he recounts. This is not to say that
Sunstein's account is merely the civic republican analogue to Epstein's
tale of Lockean liberalism. In stark contrast to Sunstein, Epstein neither
notes the last quarter-century of scholarly work nor acknowledges the

complexity of the world that work depicts.259 Even so, the substantive
253. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 133-41; James E.
Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 241-79 (1993);
Cass R. Sunstein, Response, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 Tex. L. Rev.
305, 305-13 (1993).

254. See supra text accompanying notes 218-222.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79, 235.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 218-222.

257. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 13; see Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra
note 153, at 18-27 nn.1, 2, 5, 8, 21 & 24.
258. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

259. See supra text accompanying notes 182-187.
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problems with Sunstein's account remain. Contrary to H. Jefferson
Powell, the difficulty is not that Sunstein advances a "hybrid" liberal/re-

publican Founding that cannot "serve as a corrective to concepts that it
already embodied," such as interest-group pluralism, which Sunstein

would like to correct.260 Rather, the problem is that Sunstein speaks of a
historical "hybrid," but talks only about its deliberative democratic aspects

when he considers governmental institutions and the ideas underlying
them.261
This problem emerges most clearly by looking first at institutions,
then to ideas. Recall that Sunstein views the principle Founding devices-checks and balances, federalism, bicameralism, presentment, even

judicial review-all but exclusively in a republican light, as means to promote deliberative democracy. Recall, too, that Sunstein concedes that
certain other strategies, especially Federalist acceptance of large and heterogeneous republics, rejected the contrary traditional republican "prescriptions," but reflected an ongoing republican commitment to the goal
of marshalling sufficient civic virtue to sustain a "republic of reasons."
Had Sunstein's method been less selective, however, he would have
pointed out that nearly all the mechanisms the Federalists proffered were
to some extent repudiations of classical republican devices. Nowhere
were these earlier devices more evident than in the first state constitu-

tions such as Pennsylvania's. As noted, that state's 1776 constitution featured, among other stratagems: a powerful unicameral legislature; a
weak multiple executive; a dependent judiciary; annual elections; rotation in office; even a requirement that pending bills be posted on the
statehouse door to facilitate public discussion.262 In rendering
Pennsylvania's government more representative than nearly any other
government on earth, these devices reflected a profound belief in the
people's capacity to engage in deliberative, virtuous, self-government.
Yet, just eleven years later, the national Constitution's architects treated
each of Pennsylvania's republican solutions as outmoded failures.
Sunstein's failure to place Founding institutions in sufficient context
has important implications for his account of Founding theory. Sunstein,
of course, could reply that his institutional treatment is harmless error.
That is, he could contend that checks, balances, bicameralism, and the
rest were like the newfangled commitment to large, heterogeneous polities-"modernized" prescriptions that reflected an ongoing, though not
necessarily exclusive, commitment to the goal of virtuous, deliberative democracy. And were he to say this, he would have significant scholarly
260. H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 Yale LJ. 1703, 1707 (1988).
261. James Fleming recently pointed to a similar theoretical one-sidedness in

Sunstein's work, observing, "Sunstein's liberal republicanism . . . represents a flight from
giving effect to substantive liberties to perfecting processes [of self-government]."

Fleming, supra note 253, at 260, 256-60.

262. See Pa. Const. of 1776 ?? 2, 9, 11, 19, 23. See generally Wood, Creation, supra
note 14, at 132-42 (discussing the formation of state constitutions and governments).
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support.263 Yet so dramatic a repudiation of classical republican institutions suggests something beyond mere tinkering with new means to the
same end. At the very least, it implies that the "republican" end either
had changed or was more complicated to begin with. On just this point

Sunstein's account runs headlong into scholarly themes that are, if not
"liberal," then surely not "republican."

One theme concerns rights. Had Sunstein looked back more fully,
he would have seen that early American constitutionalism centrally fea-

tured a commitment to rights understood neither as "the preconditions

[n]or the outcome of an undistorted deliberative process." Part of this
commitment had to do with natural law. For all that their work marginalized Locke, Bailyn and Wood agree that Americans viewed natural rights

as a constraint on sovereign power.264 But-and this point is criticalprobably a greater part of the commitment to rights had to do with
nondeliberative positive law. Here Reid's work convincingly argues that
Americans approached the Revolution in the belief that English law defined and protected rights through accumulated custom as well as

through foundational contracts between the rulers and the ruled, external constraints having little to do with deliberative self-government in

Sunstein's sense.265 Moreover, greater attention to the prevailing narra263. See Pocock, supra note 72, at 526-31.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 59, 98-100; Bailyn, supra note 63, at 27-34;
Morgan, supra note 107, at 289-91; Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 3-10.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 188-189. Non-deliberative positive law has
several important consequences for Sunstein's work. First, Sunstein cannot invoke it as

support for his conception of rights as the outcome of deliberative processes. The
problem is that custom and contract were seen as sources of law that could serve as
benchmarks for legislative misconduct, however deliberative, but which were themselves

the products not of deliberation but of experience. Rights derived from contract or
custom, therefore, were not results of deliberative self-government in any straightforward
way. (Conversely, for Epstein the problem is that these sources of rights nonetheless
broadly reflect the "consent of the governed," as evidenced ill the governed's ongoing

acquiescence, and thus did not provide the grounds for a judicially enforceable limit on
legislative action that itself reflected consent through representation. See supra text
accompanying notes 188-189.)

Second, Sunstein has yet to refute the possibility that non-deliberative positive law as

used here did or can identify rights unrelated to deliberative democracy. Sunstein does, to
be sure, reject the notion that the Constitution necessarily adopts "common law baselines"
as the reference point for neutral adjudication. "Common law baselines," however, should
not be confused with English rights derived from custom and contract. What Sunstein
attacks refers to legal arrangements which presume that the existing distribution of wealth,
income, and preferences reflects a natural pre-political order. See Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution, supra note 153, at 3-4, 40-92. What Reid describes are constraints on
governmental action that Anglo-American legal (and thus post-political) culture over time
recognized as essential to individual liberty, regardless of their connection to deliberation.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.

Finally, Sunstein might well have to acknowledge that other rights which he
characterizes as "straightforwardly republican" were in fact themselves hybrid. Sunstein,

Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 210, at 1562. Take for example, the right
considered preeminent at the time of the Revolution-the right to trial by jury of the
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tive from the Revolution to the Founding would have revealed the Constitution as more than simply a reaction to the emergence of factions during the Critical Period. It would have further shown the document as a
response to the attacks mounted by these factions on rights understood,
at least in part, in the non-deliberative ways just recounted. Put another

way, the problem with factions was not simply that they were self-interested. The problem was that they were self-interested in a way that infringed rights conceived of as either natural or dating from time
immemorial.266
One further "nonrepublican" theme relating to government involves

another facet of the Federalist reaction that current scholarship de-

scribes. Sunstein's central ongoing commitment to republican virtue is
precisely what the reigning narrative of the Founding denies, a denial
strengthened by the Revolutionary background to that narrative. Wood's

Creation, among other works, quotes dozens of historical actors who by
the late 1780s came to doubt America's capacity for an overarching commitment to the public good.267 As Washington put it as early as 1776,
"The few ... who act upon Principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the Ocean."268 By 1791, certain
thinkers, including Madison and James Wilson, at least arguably no
longer viewed civic virtue as the primary organizing principle for daily
government. For them, "America would remain free not because of any
quality in its citizens of spartan self-sacrifice to some nebulous public
good, but in the last analysis because of the concern each individual
would have in his own self-interest and personal freedom."269 Sunstein
follows Wood's recent work in arguing that even the hard-headed
Madison was no interest-group pluralist in the modern sense.270
Although it is not entirely clear, there is good reason to believe that
vicinage. Sunstein correctly notes that this right safeguarded and promoted civic virtue
and local participation in the administration of law. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 67, at

40-41 (noting that "juries were the government, and it was upon them that the safety of all
rights to liberty and property depended"). He fails to consider, however, the possibility

that this right was also considered an individual's entitlement largely unrelated to the
republican values just mentioned. For example, when the patriots protested against

Parliament's revival of a statute of Henry VIII mandating that treason trials take place in
the "realm"-their ire was directed less at a loss of local governmental control than it was

focused on the distressing possibility that individual Americans would be transported 3,000
miles to be tried and probably convicted before a panel of strangers, and thus be deprived

of their liberty. See 1 Reid, supra note 89, at 54-55; see generally id. at 47-64.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 98-114.

267. See Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 413-24; see generally Morgan, supra note
107, at 239-62 (discussing early efforts of the American Revolutionaries to fashion a
representative government).

268. Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (John Hancock)
(Sept. 24, 1776), in 6 The Writings of George Washington 106, 108 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1932).

269. Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 612.

270. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 153, at 21; Wood, Radicalism,
supra note 13, at 253-62.
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America's constitutional experiences from the Revolution through the

Critical Period to the Founding resulted in greater skepticism as to the
role of public-regarding deliberation than Sunstein allows. Sunstein,
however, fails to acknowledge this possibility.

In the end, the one-sidedness of his account calls into question
whether Sunstein adequately recounts the Founding in the way he in ef-

fect promises. Powell, for one, has answered that question in the negative, suggesting that "Sunstein does not offer us historical republicanism

[or, more relevantly, Federalism] and commend its virtues to us; he offers
us a contemporary political theory and notes that at times the founders

said similar things."'271 In one sense, this method is better than Epstein's
procedure. Sunstein never claims that he is describing the age's "general

mood," ostensibly oblivious to other, often contrary material, and thus
unaware of the need to make intelligent selections in the first place. Yet
in another sense, Sunstein's approach is more frustrating precisely be-

cause he gives short shrift to material that is central to the "liberal republican" sketch he offers. Sunstein might plausibly respond that his ultimate concern is the "contemporary political theory." But the fact
remains that he offers an account of history to bolster that theory. No
more than any other theorist can he invoke history in this way while escaping historical censure.

D. Look Homeward, Publians
The prospect of something better comes from a source that is both
surprising and expected. For much of his early career, Bruce Ackerman

wrote as a comparatively ahistorical political philosopher in the manner
of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. This focus, while Ackerman has
hardly abandoned it, culminated in the well-known SocialJustice in the Liberal State.272 By contrast, for the past ten years, Ackerman has concentrated on American constitutional theory in a dramatically historicist fashion. This concentration has produced his ongoing We the People project,
in which he has preached the utility of searching for distinctively American solutions to the problem of self-governance. The project's place in
Ackerman's work and its historicist approach make the major articles and

one volume that so far comprise it ideal for consideration.273 The result
is a substantial advance in the historical credibility of constitutional theory. Not that the advance is linear. Procedurally, the breadth of Ackerman's research does not match its depth, especially at points where it
matters most. Substantively, however, his work remains significantly-

and compared to many other theorists, significantly more-faithful to
271. Powell, supra note 260, at 1707.
272. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980).
273. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19. Two articles in particular
prefigured the monograph: Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,
99 Yale LJ. 453 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 Yale LJ. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures].
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the themes of both rights and self-government that are central to the prevailing historical narratives.274
It had better. For Ackerman, "fit," to borrow a term from Dwor-

kin,275 is everything-in particular, the fit of American constitutional theory to American constitutional tradition.276 Fit in this sense matters on
two levels, each of which leads Ackerman to rely heavily on history and
historical scholarship. First, as a background consideration, Ackerman
assumes that the American citizenry, bench, and bar all share a traditional commitment to democratic positivism and a weakness for at least

some version of originalism. In his words, "Americans routinely treat the
constitutional past as if it contained valuable clues for decoding the
meaning of our political present."277 We the People and its forebears consequently adopt these theoretical stances to address citizens, judges, and
lawyers on what are stipulated to be their own terms. Ackerman, at least
in the works considered, does not really make these assumptions clear;
still less does he defend them. These lapses have left him open to a considerable amount of criticism from fellow theorists.278 Yet what matters
here is that these are the theoretical tenets his project in effect adopts.
These democratic, positivist, and originalist tenets make fit matter in

a second, more explicit way. As with any theory that relies on the intentions of those who adopted constitutional norms, the critical question be-

comes how well a given interpretation of those norms comports with the
adopters' intentions.279 The We the People project consequently sets out to
do nothing less than rediscover a distinctive American constitutionalism
"by reflecting on the course of its historical development over the past
two centuries."280 Ackerman's mostly implicit theoretical commitments
274. In this Ackerman may be unusual but not alone. Mark Tushnet, for example, is
similarly conscious of what recent scholarship has to say about the Founding's central

commitment to both rights and republican self-government. See Mark Tushnet, Red,
White, and Blue, 4-17 (1988). Tushnet, moreover, relies on key historical and
historiographical works in making this point. See id. That said, Tushnet disputes at least
one of Ackerman's contentions-that constitutional politics are of a different order than
ordinary politics-on both historical and theoretical grounds. See id. at 26. For a

discussion of Ackerman's distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 279-284.

275. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 121, at 34-38, 143-45 (distinguishing fit and
political morality as the two dimensions of justification of theories underlying legal
systems).

276. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Remarks at the New York University School of Law
Colloquium on Constitutional Theory (Nov. 16, 1993) (colloquy between Bruce Ackerman
and Ronald Dworkin).

277. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 5.
278. See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The

Case of Article V, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1990); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/
Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional

Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992) (reviewing Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19).

279. For an originalist discussion placing primacy on the intentions of the Ratifiers
rather than the Framers of the Constitution, see Lofgren, supra note 17, at 77.
280. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 5.
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to fit have forced him into explicit examinations of, among other matters,
the Founding, the Civil War and Reconstruction, and the New Deal,
which for him have been the nation's three most fruitful periods in articulating constitutional norms. Put another way, because fit is everything,
everything must fit, or at least the more that fits the better.
What matters most, both for Ackerman and for this Article, is the

Founding. On Ackerman's view, the Founding gave rise neither to a
"Lockean liberal" regime nor to a civic republican regime, but instead to
one he sometimes describes as a "dualist democracy" or, significantly, as

"Neo-Federalism."'281 Ackerman uses these terms to describe a system in
which two types of decisions are made. One type entails decisions made
by the government day in and day out, which ultimately derive their authority from the electoral process. This "normal lawmaking" reflects politics grounded mainly, but not exclusively, in individual self-interest. The
other type of decisionmaking involves judgments of the American people
during rare moments of national crisis as expressed either through Article V282 or a complex process that serves as Article V's structural counterpart. This "higher lawmaking" reflects a more evanescent form of politics
in which grave challenges to the nation promote greater consideration of
the common good.283 Ackerman appears clearly sympathetic to dualism
on normative grounds. More importantly, for him the theory does not
reflect either an English natural rights philosopher like Locke, nor Continental communitarians like Machiavelli, but instead embodies the considered judgment of "We the People" of the United States from 1787 to
1791.284

Ackerman's historical understanding is more notable for its depth
than its breadth. He thoroughly discusses the work of a few key historians, but only a few. We the People itself, for example, contains short, considered essays on Beard, Hartz, Wood, and Pocock, rarities in a work of

281. Id. at 3-33, 254-65.
282. Article Five in relevant part provides:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the

Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three

fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
U.S. Const. art. V.

283. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 173-79.
284. In certain senses, Ackerman does not view the Founding as complete until 1804.
On his account, Jefferson's election in 1800 fine-tuned the Constitution by transforming
the Presidency from an office predicated on demonstrated public virtue to a post based on
ideological popularity-a transformation obliquely acknowledged in the Twelfth

Amendment. Conversely, the Jeffersonians were unsuccessful in attempting t
Federal judiciary to renounce judicial review. See id. at 70-73.
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constitutional theory.285 Conversely, other historians receive passing reference, but frequently no more than that. This problem grows the further Ackerman strays from 1787 itself. In particular, We the People's extended discussion of the Revolution, though mostly theoretical rather
than historical, nonetheless slights such important scholars as Morgan,
Greene, Reid, and Black. If anything, Ackerman is even more thorough
yet selective in his treatment of the ever popular The Federalist.286 As is so
often the case, however, none of the dozens, if not hundreds, of writers
who debated the Constitution along with "Publius" makes an appearance.
Off toward the horizon further still are any writings from the Revolution

or Critical Period out of which "Publian" solutions emerged.
Not surprisingly, Ackerman's circumscribed rigor cuts in opposite directions. Along one path, the method renders his specific assertions convincing within their sphere. He commits no tell-tale factual errors and

ably supports his reading of one vital work and of certain historiographical developments. Along the other path, Ackerman's basic procedure by
definition renders his use of sources, especially primary materials, more
limited and so less persuasive than it might be. Likewise, and more significantly, the policy of depth over breadth necessarily handicaps Acker-

man's contextual assertions about the Founding as opposed to his specific interpretation of The Federalist. To take one example, critical for
Ackerman's dualist account is the assertion that "Publius," and the Foun-

ders generally, believed that constitutional lawmaking could occur only in
rare periods of national crises during which danger repressed passion.287
This may be a fair reading of Publius in The Federalist No. 49 (here
Madison) but, unlike many of Ackerman's other Publian claims, it is a
controversial interpretation of the Federalist position generally.288 On
balance, Ackerman's reading does plausibly echo key themes sounded by
Wood. Still, one passage from one essay in one collection is a shaky foundation on which to build a major wing of a model constitutional structure. Less dramatically, Ackerman's reliance on but a handful of historians-though a choice handful-sustains his larger contextual points less
effectively than he otherwise could, doubly so given his habit of overlooking work on the Revolution. Too often these kinds of shortcuts signal an
285. See id. at 25-27 (Hartz), 27-29 (Pocock), 213-21 (Wood), 219-23 (Beard).
Ackerman also offers similar treatments of Douglass Adair, id. at 223-24, and Martin
Diamond, id. at 224-27.

286. The Storrs Lectures provide by far the most rigorous citations. See Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures, supra note 273, at 1021-33. In contrast to Sunstein and in stark
contrast to Epstein, We the People, its precursors, or both, make specific and usually

thoughtful reference to Numbers 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 28, 31, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 51, 53, 55, 57,

58, 60, 63, 65, 69, 71, 76, and 78.

287. Ackerman begins his central discussion of the Founding by speaking of "the
Founders," but then quickly shifts to talking almost exclusively about The Federalist or

"Publius." See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 165-99.
288. See Amar, Consent, supra note 201 (disputing that amendments outside Article
V are confined to infrequent periods of national crisis).
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insouciance about historical standards of the type problematic in Sunstein's work and rampant in Epstein's.
The irony in all this is that Ackerman appears to know better, yet

chooses not to exploit the advantage. Even his passing references make
clear that he has surveyed the secondary literature of at least the Found-

ing more extensively than most contemporary theorists.289 Ackerman's
general command of secondary material also implies familiarity with pri-

mary works other than The Federalist, since much of this literature tracks
an encyclopedic array of contemporary sources closely and explicitly.290
This evidently wider learning, combined with narrowly applied rigor, suggests a tactical decision not to "bog down" an already complex account
with "arcane" detours and specifics.
The price in terms of historical credibility, though hardly prohibitive, is needlessly costly. Ackerman's policy of circumscribed thoroughness has left him open to several published criticisms of his historical
methods which, coming from lawyers, have not exactly been models of
professional rigor themselves.291 More importantly, it has left him open

to a degree of unpublished skepticism among legal and constitutional
289. See supra text accompanying notes 1-19, 144-271.
290. Gordon Wood's work especially is noted for its dense use of primary source
quotations within the text. A typical passage reads:

"An Aged Farmer" of New Jersey in 1770 urged his fellow farmers to stop
complaining about the gentry's fox-hunting on their land. "Begrudging the
young Men of [Philadelphia] the Use of this Diversion in our Woods" was
shortsighted, he said. These gentlemen more than made up for "all the little
injuries that they may do by Accident, in Pursuit of those noxious Animals," by
consuming our produce. Who else, he asked, would purchase our watermelons if
not these gentry? Fox-hunting may have been a "Luxury" as charged, but so were
watermelons. "They are of no Kind of Use as Food," and yet the gentry "pay us
some Thousand Pounds a Year" for them. The Jersey farmers were indebted to the
gentry's luxuries. Being able to dispose of his "Truck" in "the Philadelphia Market
... for Cash, without paying. . . Toll for having the Liberty of selling it," was for
this old Jersey farmer an "Indulgence" that had brought him "much good living
in my Time," for which he acknowledged his gratitude, "as should also my
Countrymen, who are mostly under the same Obligations."
Wood, Radicalism, supra note 13, at 34-35 (citation omitted).
291. Suzanna Sherry, for example, dismisses Ackerman's "sloppy history" in a fashion
which itself is conclusory and cites neither Appleby, Bailyn, Morgan, Morris, Reid, Wood,
nor, for that matter, any other professional historian. Sherry, supra note 278, at 923. To
take one specific instance, Sherry castigates Ackerman for interpreting The Federalist to
recommend that "constitutional politics" may often best be conducted through irregular
mechanisms such as conventions, saying, "[a]bsolutely no evidence exists that Publius was
speaking of what Ackerman calls 'irregular' constitutional politics as opposed to the formal
method of amending the Constitution." Id. at 926. Among other things, Sherry's charge
fails to acknowledge that "the People" had just engaged in exactly such a form of irregular

constitutional politics, an act that itself echoed earlier irregular acts of constitutional
change in Anglo-American history. These contextual points may not demonstrate that
Publius thought no future acts of constitutional lawmaking would take place outside the
orderly framework of Article V. But they count for something more than "[a] bsolutely no

evidence." For a further discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying notes
296-297.
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historians.292 More significant still, it ironically masks the genuine substantive fidelity of Ackerman's dualist account to critical themes in the
work of historians who themselves looked to reconstruct early American
constitutional thought and law.
Ackerman's account passes substantive muster, at least as a preliminary matter,293 because it follows how recent historical scholarship has
reconstructed a distinctively American conception of government that at
least reconciles, and at most synthesizes, the principal constitutional currents evident in the late eighteenth century. In this quest, We the People

comes down on the side of synthesis, contending that "We the People,"
for whom the work is named, consciously embraced a new type of consti-

tutionalism.294 This proposition is debatable yet plausible. Debate has
proceeded over the question whether any grand understanding, or un-

derstandings, of government emerge from the thousands of pages of
early American constitutional discourse. Conversely, generalization does
not mean reductionism. If recent scholarship suggests anything, it is that

American constitutional thought, taken as a whole, did undergo discernable shifts from the Revolution to the Critical Period to the Framing, culminating in what Wood calls a new "American [s]cience of [p]olitics."295
Beyond the Founding, David Dow likewise chides Ackerman (as well as Akhil Amar)

for the "abuse of history." Dow, supra note 278, at 46. In particular, Dow challenges
Ackerman on his interpretations of the Civil War and Reconstruction. By misreading
Ackerman and focusing on the wrong election, Dow specifically challenges Ackerman's
contention that certain national elections may signal constitutional politics outside Article

V. Thus, in one sentence he argues that the 1860 election was too confusing to stand for
any constitutional point, and in the next criticizes Ackerman for claiming that the nation
understood the Reconstruction Republicans of the Thirty-Ninth Congress to be engaging
in constitutional politics. See id. at 51. As Ackerman himself points out, if one is to look at
any election to figure out popular constitutional understandings in 1866, it is the election
of 1866. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 93.

292. I have personally noted informal skepticism about the We the People project
voiced by some at various legal history conferences and colloquia. Often, however, the

doubts expressed go not to any discrete point Ackerman has made, but instead voice a
general concern about keeping legal theorists off historians' "turf." Against this viewpoint
Ackerman offers a strong rejoinder:

[A] small, but devoted, band of professional historians . . . are so intent on

elaborating the vast gulf separating 1787 from 1987 that they verge on
condemning as unhistorical any suggestion that modem Americans may have
something to learn about themselves by establishing a meaningful relationship to

the Founding.... And yet, the fact is that today's constitutional language and
practice can be traced back to the Founding. Americans will lose a vital resource

for political self-understanding if we estrange ourselves from these origins.
Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 166-67. Moreover, historians who have
looked into the substance of Ackerman's project have been favorable to his approach. See
infra text accompanying notes 304-309.

293. "Preliminary" because, as has often been pointed out, the first volume of We the
People promises more historical detail in the future.

294. This position is evident at numerous points. See, e.g., Ackerman, We the People,
supra note 19, at 67-70, 165-68.
295. Wood, Creation, supra note 14, at 593-615. Wood concludes Creation, stating:
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More importantly, Ackerman's account of this conscious synthesis
concentrates on more than just one constitutional vision or tradition.
Unlike Epstein, Ackerman acknowledges-even celebrates-the Constitution's republican pedigree. He does this first in viewing higher lawmaking as the intended preserve for a periodic politics of civic virtue and
revolutionary selflessness. As previously described, We the People suggests
that such periods of "constitutional politics" will be few and far between,

in part because only times of great national crisis can 'jolt" Americans
into mass civic activity and public-spirited discourse. As also noted, the
only primary source Ackerman invokes to support this proposition is The
Federalist No. 40. But, as should be acknowledged, Ackerman's argument
receives indirect yet significant support from the work of Wood and Morgan on the historical synecdoche for constitutional politics, "popular sovereignty." As these historians have pointed out, early American constitutionalists eventually hit on the idea that procedurally irregular-even
extralegal-conventions paradoxically conferred more legitimacy on

constitutions than legislatures could, in part because their very irregular
ity suggested greater civic fervor and representativeness.296 This insight
helps Ackerman first because irregularity in the abstract suggests infrequency, and second because conventions in this sense had occurred only
during times of crisis in fact, at least as far as Anglo-American history to
1787 is concerned. Ackerman, moreover, wisely notes these points.297
We the People further recognizes the continued legacy of republican
constitutionalism in considering various Constitutional mechanisms as

ways to "economize" on virtue even during long stretches of "normal"
lawmaking. Here Ackerman's work at least partially accords with Sunstein's analysis in arguing that the Federalists utilized an array of devices
for promoting self-government based upon public-regarding reasons.

For Ackerman, these devices begin with a scheme of representation that

gives elected officials "incentives to engage in public-spirited delibera
tion...."298 The scheme achieves this goal by multiplying the number
and nature of representative bodies, casting the House as the guardian of
So piecemeal was the Americans' formulation of this system, so diverse and
scattered in authorship, and so much a simple response to the pressures of
democratic politics was their creation, that the originality and the theoretical
consistency and completeness of their constitutional thinking have been
obscured. It was a political theory that was diffusive and open-ended; it was not
delineated in a single book; it was peculiarly the product of a democratic society,
without a precise beginning or an ending. It was not political theory in the grand
manner, but it was a political theory worthy of a prominent place in the history of
Western thought.
Id. at 615.

296. See id. at 306-43; Morgan, supra note 107, at 94-96, 107-13, 267-87.
297. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 19, at 173-79. In an audacious y

plausible move, Ackerman moves beyond this point to suggest that Wood himself fails
realize that "constitutional politics" reflects an ongoing role for revolutionary/republ
politics rather than a cynical Federalist manipulation of populist rhetoric. Id. at 219298. Id. at 198.
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"popular opinion," the Senate as the locus for "knowledgeable judgment," and the President as the embodiment of "energy and decisiveness."299 Further devices to make the most of what public spirit exists
include separation of powers, which will promote virtuous government by
insuring that no single institution can claim that it speaks for the nation
without that claim first being subject to the counterclaims of the other
branches.300 Finally, judicial review promotes the values of virtuous selfgovernment by commanding thatjudges give special weight to the constitutional choices previously made by popular majorities during times of
national crisis.301
While the specifics may be debated, the general theme of economizing on virtue itself has the virtue of reflecting central points in current

scholarship. It corresponds with the thesis that virtuous self-government
mattered-in fact that it mattered so much it formed the central organizing principles of America's first written constitutions. It further reflects
the thesis that experience showed this organizing principle to be in need
of important reforms. In these ways, We the People's dualist model acknowledges that the republican currents that were at flood tide in the
first round of state constitution-making did not evaporate, but were in-

stead directed in new ways, however much they ebbed.
But they did ebb. Unlike Sunstein, Ackerman also stresses that the
Constitution was launched while new and different currents flooded na-

tional discourse. These currents, We the People contends, proceeded with
the profoundly sobering recognition that Americans lacked sufficient
public spirit to make virtue the sole, or even primary, basis for self-govern-

ment. Any attempt to do so would only expose individual rights and the
public good to majoritarian excesses. As Ackerman puts it, "during normal times, groups will form on the basis of passion or interest to use state
power at the expense of the rights of other citizens and the permanent
interests of the community."302 The constitutional trick therefore became designing a system that, at least during normal times, would recognize the electorate's newly discovered penchant for faction and insure
that rights were placed beyond the reach of majoritarian tyranny. In this
new, darker light, both unfamiliar and familiar constitutional devices take
on a different hue. No longer can they be seen solely as mechanisms for
restoring public-spirited politics pure and simple. Instead, they indicate
that-again, at least during normal times-neither the national nor the
state electorates can be trusted entirely. Instead, the very division of constitutional and normal politics suggests the qualitative superiority of the
former. Further, devices such as divided representation, separation of
powers, and judicial review serve as "fail-safe" mechanisms against hope-

299. Id. at 184.

300. See id. at 184.

301. See id. at 191-95.
302. Id. at 187.
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fully infrequent yet surely inevitable breakdowns of public-spirited
politics.303
In these ways, We the People further situates the Constitution in the

narrative of early American constitutional development. First, Acker-

man's work implicitly-or to be accurate, inadvertently-reflects recent
scholarship on the Revolution, particularly insofar as dualism suggests a
more structured return to a framework in which concern for both rights
and self-government coexisted before Independence revealed the deep
tensions between them. Further, it explicitly acknowledges the now basic
historical point that the Federalists developed their "new science of poli-

tics" as a reaction to the excesses of classical republicanism previously
evident in the state legislatures and in the people who voted for them.

Dualist democracy thus rests on an appeal to experience that appears substantively plausible. In contrast to legal commentators, histori-

ans themselves have recognized this. Edmund S. Morgan has stated that
the first volume of We the People "deserves to stand with Beard's . . . as a
landmark" in constitutional scholarship, which offers "us a fresh and convincing view ... of our constitutional history."304 Morgan, in fact, goes so
far as to say that Ackerman's sense of the past is more persuasive than his
theoretical models.305 In similar though more guarded fashion, Eben
Moglen allows that "there are profound attractions in Ackerman's [dualist] resolution," both in terms of the secondary works and The Federalist.306 Likewise, Richard Bernstein has written that Ackerman's work is
"ambitious and largely successful."307 This is not to say that these historians find no flaws.308 Bernstein nonetheless sums up the views of all three
historians in stating that "Ackerman . . . uses the materials he draws on,

303. See id. at 190-95, 198.
304. Edmund S. Morgan, The Fiction of 'The People," N.Y. Rev. of Books, Apr. 23,
1992, at 46, 46, 48 (book review).

305. "Ackerman is much more persuasive in his intuitive recognition of the
phenomenon [i.e., "We the People" engaging in higher lawmaking] in the past ... [than
he is] . . . when he proposes a test for successful constitutional politics in our own

time...." Id. at 48.
306. Eben Moglen, The Incompleat Burkean: Bruce Ackerman's Foundation for
Constitutional History, 5 Yale J.L. & Human. 531, 541 (1993) (book review).

307. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1600.
308. Morgan states,
Ackerman, I think, accepts a little too readily Madison's contention that the

people themselves acted in creating the Constitution. The calling of the
Constitutional Convention came about without any visible popular demand, its
members were not popularly elected, and ratification was achieved in the several
state conventions by dubious means ....

Morgan, supra note 304, at 48. Moglen contends that "a constitutional history predicated
on the entire absence of counter-revolutionary elements from Federalist thought [as
Ackerman's threatens to be] would be as misleading as the Progressive historiography to
which Ackerman objects." Moglen, supra note 306, at 542. Bernstein notes that

Ackerman's research strategy is overly "selective." Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1602.
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however selective his research, with ample sensitivity to their arguments

and historical contexts."309
That said, We the People might have put forward an even better substantive case had it examined recent scholarship still further. At least two

general concerns bear mention, each of which arises most clearly in light
of recent work on the Founding's revolutionary background. For starters,

Ackerman skimps on what Edward S. Corwin termed "the 'I[h] igher

[Il]aw' background of American Constitutional law."'310 As a matter of
theory, We the People has little patience for "natural law" or "right rea-

son -as a source of constitutional rights or values.311 Of greater relevance here, still less does the work have any place for natural law as a

matter of history. Rather, Ackerman attributes to the Federalists a belief

that vestigial American virtue, marshaled during times of national crisis,
would suffice to insure that positive higher law that "We the People"
make would reflect a considered commitment to fundamental values and

rights. Any strategy for protecting rights outside constitutional politics
can only be an ahistorical and essentially un-American import.

But virtuous higher lawmaking may not be all the Federalists believed in. As Bailyn pointed out a generation ago, American Whigs
marched toward revolution with "the law of nature" as one of several arrows in their quiver.312 Though Reid strongly argues that English constitutional principles all but eclipsed American reliance on natural law, his
position has yet to carry the day; nor does Ackerman rely on his work.
Moreover, it is implausible that natural law dropped out of the picture
after 1776 any more than republicanism disappeared after 1787. To the
contrary, reliance on natural law-or something like it-remains a
theme in scholarship moving past the Revolution. It further appears evident in numerous well-known contemporary articulations, including the

Declaration of Independence,313 Roger Sherman's draft bill of rights,314

309. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1602.

310. Corwin, supra note 170, at 85.

311. Ackerman, for example, concedes that-at least in most cases-the considered
judgments of "We the People" must be honored even should they prove unpalatable or
violate tenets derived from rights "foundationalism." Ackerman, We the People, supra
note 19, at 13-15. For a thorough theoretical critique of this stance, seeJames E. Fleming,
We the Exceptional American People, 11 Const. Commentary 355 (1994);
312. See Bailyn, supra note 57, at 26-30.

313. See The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
314. Roger Sherman, then a representative from Connecticut, wrote a working draft
of a Federal Bill of Rights in July 1789. Article 2 declared:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they
enter into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of
acquiring property and of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and
publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling
to consult their common good, and of applying to Government by petition or
remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not
be deprived by the Government of the united States.
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early American constitutionalism
than a trivial way. For all that We the People recognizes the Federalists'
"liberal" diagnosis of self-interested factionalism during normal times, it
fails to come to terms with the arguably older "liberal" commitment to
rights outside any majoritarian decisionmaking process, however infrequent, representative, and virtuous those decisions may be. To the extent

that We the People ignores this commitment-in failing even to make an
attempt to discount it-Ackerman's account cannot claim the total "fit"
to the Founding it seeks.

Conversely, Ackerman misses a second substantive point that would
surely help him. As those historians who take American constitutionalism
most seriously demonstrate, Americans engaged in a rich constitutional

discourse well before Independence. In this way, Ackerman's account
overlooks how the Constitution, far from being the American people's
first break from a previous constitutional regime, was in fact one of a
series of epic splits. From the patriot constitution's break from the
emerging English Constitution of parliamentary sovereignty, to the state

republican constitutions' breaks from the patriot constitution, and only
then to the Constitution shaped in Philadelphia in 1787, the early
American people were not strangers to constitutional upheaval. From
this perspective, Ackerman's scheme of three irregular "constitutional
moments" becomes less jarring. On examination, that scheme may well
fit a much longer American tradition.
Neither of these points, either natural law traditions or pre-Constitu-

tion constitutionalism, should cloud the overall assessment. In part procedurally, more so substantively, the We the People project merits serious
consideration in its use of history. To the extent that history matters,
therefore, Ackerman's work further merits consideration normatively, as
theory. As one historian commented, dualism may even "have interesting
implications for historical discourse ...."317 Whatever its specific defects
or whatever will be its eventual revisions, Ackerman's account bears a sufReprinted in The Rights Retained by the People app. A at 351 (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1989).

315. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); see
also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 819, 872 (1981).

316. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 332 (1827) (Marshall,
C.J., dissenting); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating state
legislature's recision of previous land grants on the basis of both the Contracts Clause and

of "general principles which are common to our free institutions"); see alsoJohn P. Roche,

Natural Law and Contracts inJohn Marshall, Major Opinions and Other Writings, 147-48

(John P. Roche ed., 1967); James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the
Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against

the State, 31 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 421-24 (1982); Nathan Isaacs, Note, Marshall on Contracts:

A Study in Early American Juristic Theory, 7 Va. L. Rev. 413 (1921).
317. Bernstein, supra note 69, at 1602.
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ficient "touch of rightness" to serve as a basis for further dialogue be-

tween past and present constitutionalists.
CONCLUSION

No longer must American constitutional thinkers look beyond
America when seeking insight from the past. Colleagues across the court-

yard in history departments, by taking the arguments earlier American
constitutionalists made seriously, and by considering arguments other

than just those made one summer in Philadelphia, have achieved stunning success in reconstructing the constitutional discourse that led to

revolution, to independence, and to the document we live under today.
The success presents a singular opportunity to modern theorists. Some,

like Ronald Dworkin, decline the invitation. But many others do not.

The early returns, at least those considered here, are mixed yet promising. Procedurally, they indicate that legal academics themselves may
never be expected to pursue the often tedious work that keeps historians
employed. They can and should, however, be expected to do their basic
homework now that the materials are there for the taking. Substantively,
the initial results suggest that constitutional theory can neither rest solely
on a commitment to self-rule or to rights. Early American constitutional
scholarship indicates to the contrary that the Founders were among the
first to perceive concretely the conflict between these two values. It there-

fore no longer seems safe to say that their solution came down exclusively

on the side of rights, "liberalism," or "autonomy." Yet neither does it appear safe to say that their "new science of politics" came down exclusively
on the side of democracy, "civic republicanism," or "democratic process."
In avoiding either extreme in substance as well as rhetoric, Bruce Ackerman may well be on to something. But whether dualism is sound as
either history or theory, one thing more seems clear. The work of early
American constitutional thinkers merits our attention not just because
they outlined the framework we still follow, nor merely because many
were brilliant individuals in extraordinary times, but as well because they
did confront and again can offer a fresh perspective on problems that still
challenge their modern heirs.
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